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KSPPIjER

The cLefend-int, who w.-is h mrtnuf .-icturer, became
acquainted with and a follower of Hitler as early as
1927 find acted as the latter's economic advisor.

He

was a convinced Nazi and still retains a high degree
of loyalty toward Hitler believing, as he says, that

during the early years, at least. Hitler's orogr/im was
well-intentioned and was fraught with good for the

German people, but as the years passed Hitler, due to
illness and strain, ch<'inged. When Goering bec;ime
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, KEPPLER lost

much, if not all, of his influence on economic matters,

at least from a political standpoint, although he
remained importrmt in certain fields such as synthetics,
I

fats, oils, and other materials.

In 1936 KEPPLER was given full authority over the

direction of the Nazi Party's activities in Austria.

From

that time on he, as Hitler's direct representative,
exercised these functions.

The Austrian Anschluss had

long oeen the subject of Hitler's plfois of expansion.

No secret was made of it.

When the Nazi Party expanded

into Austria .and while outwardly independent of the Reich
Nazi Party,

it was in fact wholly its creature.

Its

members and officers took orders from Hitler and held

office only so long as they obeyed Hitler.

After the

unsuccessful Putsch in 1934, in the course of which

Dollfuss Was murdered, the Party was outlawed in Austria
•and, as the defendant and his witnesses claim, its
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meniDers were suDjected "to dlscriminatJlon and at; "times

"to imprisonment.

But it persisted as an underground

movement with support, financi'^l and otherwise, from the
Nazi Party in Germany.

A party which commences an armed

revolt .ind assassinates a head of a state can hardly oe

regarded as.a persecutee if the government thus assaulted
t;ikes measures to "orevent similar occurrences in the

future, and that in this case a recurrence was reasonaoly
to oe expected there can oe no douot#
One of the leaders of the Austri.-oi Nazi Party

w.-is Leopold, who was strongly of the opinion that
forciole measures should oe taken.

However, until Hitler felt sure that forcible

action against Austria would not bring down upon him

Italy as well as the other Western Powers, Leopold*s
attitude co'nstituted .a hazard.

KEPPLER was appointed,

among other things, to prevent the occurrence of that
state of affairs.

This he did, and Leopold was removed

from the scene of action.

During 1937 the defendant KEPPLER and his assist.-tnt,
the defendant VEESENLiAXER, made several trioS to Austria,

consulted with Party leaders, and directed the activities

of the Party there.

As a result of Schuschnigg's

Berchtesgaden conference with Hitler of 12 February. 1938,
the Austrian Premier was comoelled to appoint Seyss-Inquart,
a member of the Austrian Cabinet, as Minister of the
Interior and head of the Security Police, wha, with others,
bored from^thin and continually increased pressure was
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brought by Germany find the Party on him and his government
until, on 9 March 1939, Schuschnigg determined to hold a

plobiscite to determine the question of Austria^s
independence.

This, to Hitler, was a red flag and events marched

rapidly.

KEPPLSR was in Vienna on "that date and was

immediately called to Berlin, reaching there on the 10th
of March.

He there mride a report to Hitler and after

this conference, on Hitler^s orders, he returned to Vienna.

There is a dispute in the testimony as to the ex<act hour
of his arriv.-a

and as to whether he delivered or reiterated

the German ultimatum, namely, that Schuschnigg must resign

and Seyss-Inquart be appointed in his place or the German

Army would march in.

President Miklas testified that KEPPLER

delivered such an ultimatum to him, and Hombostel, of the

Austrian Foreign Office, testified

that during that day

he received reports not only of KEPPLER^S and VEESENIIAYER'S
arrival at Vienaa, but that KEPPLER had delivered an
ultimatum to the Austrian President.

We oelieve and find

that he did so, although there is reasonable doubt whether
this took place before or 'ifter General Muff, German

< '

Military Attache at Vienna, had delivered a like one.
But we deem it immaterial which ultimatum was first
delivered.

The defendant would have us believe that he acted

in a Vacuum in this matter .--ind had neither knowledge of

nor activity in the unwarranted interference in.Austrian

.116-

aff.ars.

His story, however, is quite increiible.

He

returned to Berlin to report, and after that, us he was

ordered, he flew oack to Vienna.
the crucial hours.

He was there during

He admits conferring with Miklas and

in fact the record of his telephone conversation with

Goering so states.

KEPPLER was in Vienna to do Hitler^s

will, and it is beyond the realm of possibility that
he was not informed before he left Berlin precisoly what
was to occur and what part he was to play.
Neither Hitler nor the Third Reich had the

slightest justification or excuse to interfere in Austrian
affairs, particularly in view of the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles ;ind the agreement's which the Third
Reich entered into with the

Austrian

State,

Hitler's

actions bec-one aggressive as soon as he felt that it was
safe to do so and as soon as it became clear that there

might be a plebiscite which possibly
clans.

would upset his

Resist.-mce by Austria was useless and hopeless

and therefore none was offered when the Wchrmacht poured
over the borders and took possession of the Austrian

State,

But before the army marched in, armed bands

of the SS and other Nazi organizations mder German

direction took cossession of the Government, arrested

its leading officers, and patrolled the streets.

In the

unlawful invasion of Austria KEPPLER played an important
part and we find him GUILTY under Count One,
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Bohemia an*! MorMvia.

. According to the defendant' s

statement, in Decemoer 1938 — the exact date oelng
uncert,ain — Hitler ordered KEPPLER, according to his

statement, to t.-lte Interest in Slov.-Lhlan affairs.

We

think it quite likely that this was due to Hitler's fears
that the tension between the Czechs and the Slov-iks, which

had apparently lessened, as c-tn oe seen from Hencke's
report of 28 December 1938, would disappear. Such a
condition was highly unsatisfactory to Hitler's plans to
destroy Czechoslov.-uhia. On 7 March 1939 KEPPLER was

present at the Goering conference with Tuka, Durcansky,
and other Slov:iks. On 11 March 1939 KEPPLER went to
Pressburg, Bratislava, and negotiated with Sidor.

On 12 March Altenburg reported to Ribbentroo that
KEPPLER had telephoned that the situation in Slov.-tkia was
"in a mess," that Seyss-Inquart and Buerkel had oeen

fooled by the people on the other side and Sidor had
apparently been bribed by the Czechs and one couldn t
do anything with him that at present there was calm in
Bratislava .-uid it would be rather difficult to find new

starting points, and that Durcansky's proclam/ition had
indiscreetly already reached foreign correspondents.
On the night of 12-13 March 1939, Tiso was visited and
decided to fly to Berlin and left Vienna at one o'clock

in company with KEPPLER.

He was received by Hitler at

,1915 hours on 13 March, 'ind in the course of that
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I iiii'i'i. iiiLiTil^'i

confei-ence Hitler statel that he had oeen disappointed by

the Slov.'ilsiian attitude and had been faced with the difficuit
decision"whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy it,
that he sent KEPPLER as his Minister to Pressburg, to

whom Sidor h-td declared that he was still a soldier of

Prague and would opoose the separation of Slov-ikia from
the Czechoslov.-ihian nation.

Hitler stated he permitted

Minister Tiso to come to Berlin in order to make the

question clear in a very short time, that it was a matter
of indifference to him what happened in Slov/ikia .-uid that

the question was whether Slov.-Usiia wished to conduct her
ovm affairs or not, but he, Hitler, did not wish anything

from her, that it was not a question of days but of hours. ^
Hitler sta.ted that if Slov-ikia wished to m.-tke herself

independent he would support this endeavor and guarantee
it, and he would stand by his_ word as long as Slovikia
would m a^:e it clear that she wished her independence, but
if she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the

connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of

Slov.-Otia to the mercy of events for which he was no

longer responsiole,

Tiso replied that Hitler could

rely uoon Slov/dcia but he wished to be excused.for the
reason that under the impression made by Hitler he could

not clearly express his opinion at that moment or could

hardly make a decision, that he wished to withdraw with
his friend ?ind think the whole question over at his ease,

but that they would show that they were worthy of Hitler* s
care and interest for their country*
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On 14 Mnrch 1939 Tlso flew back to Bratisl/iva

and Slovakia declared her independence.

On 15 March' Hitler summoned the aged and ailing

Hacha, President of the Ozechoslovakian Republic, to
Berlin, and at on early hour of the morning, after

threats that Prague would be bombed, Hacha was forced
to submit. But German troops had already marched into
Ozechoslov:ikia hours before Hacha succumbed to Hitler's
threats.

Tho Germ.-in troops met with some resistance

from CzochosloV'tkian forces, but the Czechs were speedily
overcome and the remainder of the Czech state fell.

KEPPLER

was present at Hitler's headquarters during the

Hacha conference, but claims that he w.as only there to
listen.

The defendant professes to have known nothing

about Hitler's plan, although in one of his statements

he admits th-it he thought something of that nature might
occur. We are unable to believe him.

import'int part in this matter.

He played .'in

The separation cf Slov-tkia

from the Czechoslov.akian state was an important and .'in

integral part of Hitler's plan of .aggression.
Nor did he go to Czechoslov.'ikia merely .as -in
observer.

In his o^^m affidavit he admitted that he was

assigned in March 1939 to negotiate .and conclude a treaty

of friendship and defense with Slovfikia.

We find th.at the

defendant had knowledge of Hitler's pl.!in for aggression
ag.ainst Czechosloy/Jcia, knew that it was indefensible,
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and that he willingly participated in it.

We find

him GUILTY under Count One in connection with the

aggression against Ozechoslov/^ikia.
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'"I

WOERUMN

In addition to the general charges contained in

Count One, it is specifically alleged that the defendant
WCG;RI':IAHN .'ind other defendants named "as high officials of

the German Foreign Office, played dominant roles in the

diplomatic plans and preparations for invasions and wars
of 'iggression, and later participated in the diplomatic

phases of the waging of these wars."

It is further

specifically alleged that memoers of the German Foreign
Office, including the defendants TOERIvlANN and T,VEIZSAECKER,
were secretly preparing the groundwork for aggression in
Cz.echoslov,'ikia by providing politic lI, military and financial
assistance to the Sudeten German Party, under the leadership

of one Konrad Honlein, and inciting that movement to lodge
continu-d defiiands for the complete separation of the
Sudetenland from the

Czechoslov-'tklan repuolic,

it is further asserted that the defendant WOERIiANN,
together with other defendants, participated in a series

of diplomatic /md oolitical moves against Poland whereby,

in disregard of recent assurances and agreements, the return

of Danzig and the Polish Corridor w-as demanded as .a pretext

for aggression.

Polish counter-proposals for the oeaceful

settlement cf German claims were rejected, and an energetic

progr.-im to mobilize potential allies in the German ,cause of
aggression and to neutralize France and Great Britain as

possible opponents was undertaken.

It is 'asserted that the

"political, propaganda and diplomatic blueprint for this
war of aggression was carefully designed" oy WOERl'iANN and
other defendants with a view to shifting the apparent

responsibility for the war to the victim.
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It is apparent

that borler incidents were staged and alleged acts of

terrorism committed by the Poles against German nationals
and rticial Germans were fabricated and publicized.

It is

further asserted that all attempts by Prance, Great Britain,

the United States and other nations to persuade the German

Reich to agree to a peaceful settlement of the dispute with
Poland were rejected.

It is then asserted that in the early

hours of ISeptember 1939, Germany launched this war of
aggression which later involved Great Britain, Prance and
a great part of the world.
It is further asserted that defendant WOERMANN and

others ;a1so participated in the preparation of the aggressions
against Norw.-iy, Denmark, the Netherl-oids, Belgium and
Luxembourg, and it is further asserted that defendc-mt WOERlviANN

and others participated in the preparation and planning of
the attack against the Union

on 22 June 1941.

of Soviet Socialist Republics

It' is asserted that WOERMANN ;^nd others,

through diplomatic efforts, secured the military support of

Rumania and Hungary for such venture.

It is further alleged

that WOERMANN and other members of the German Foreign Office,

from early 1941, made continuous diplomatic efforts to induce

Japc-jJi to attack British possessions in the Par East,

It is

further alleged that WOERMANN and other defendants, as lead

ing offici.'ils of the Germ.-in Foreign Office, participated in

the political development .-ind direction of the occupied
territories, particularly those territories wherein puppet

governments under the domination of the Oerm?in Foreign
Office had been installed.

By the maintenance of continuous

diplomatic pressure, intimidation /ind coercion, the puppet
and Satellite governments were compelled to support Gemany
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in the course of Its

wars of aggression.

Further, they

participated in the partitioning of certain of the occupied
territories, including Yugoslavia, and in the evolution

of plans

for the final integration of the occupied countries

into the or'olt of the Gcrm;tn Reich after the cessation of
hostilities,

Defendrtnt WOERI^iiANN was Ministerial Director and
Chief of the Political Division of the Foreign Office in
Berlin with the title of Under-Seoretary of State fi-'om

April 1938 to April 1943.

This defendant testifying before the Tribunal on
6 July 1948 stated:

"I also did and do consider myself responsible

for what happened in the Political Division, of
which I v/,as head, even when I did not approve or
did not hnow the individual cases,"

The defend int did seek. Id show that the office of Chief of

Political Division had decreased in significance so that

during the time that he v./as head thereof it was -ai office
of secondary importance.
with the facts.

This, however, does not square

The record is replete with evidence of

incidents showing that during the times in question WOSRTMNN
Was charged with and energetically carried out important

duties raid assignments vjhich often Involved the exercise of
a wide discretion and had a bearing on the plans and oolicios
which were being considered or were in the process of
execution.

The defendant also sought to show that he was on

unfriendly terms ivith his chief, Rlbbentrop, from 1938 to
1943, and in his testimony before this Tribunal on 6 July
1948 he -alluded to various incidents to support such claim.

This, however, is not especially significant for the fact
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remains that he actually stayed in office under Ribbentrop

from 1938 to 1943, - five eventful and critical years.

Apparently

their differences were not so fundamental as to

have prompted WO"ERMANN to obstruct th% plans or wishes of
Ribbentrop or to cause ^VOERMANN to fail in satisfactorily

complying with Ribbentrop's wishes* in connection with the
carrying out of the aggressive plans and policies of the
Nazi regime.

That WOER]i/lANN did actively participate in

carrying out the criminal plans and policies of the Reich

seems to be amply borne out by the testimony.
It appears that although Ribbentrop, according to
the statement of defendant, had indicated to the defendant

that he did not desire to "^receive any unsolicited advice

Ribbentrop did, on 24 July 1941, send a secret wire to
\VOER]\yIANN wherein he directed defendant WOERMANN to carry

on a proptiganda campaign "on ajn exact study of the weak
spots of the Americ?-tn or English policy."
The evidence discloses that the political division
which was under WOERMANN'S charge, as above indicated, gave

close attention to the carrying out of Ribbentrop*s wishes
in this matter, for in November 1941, ;VOERMANN gave detailed

instruction to officials in his department with respect to

propag.-inda to be employed.

W0ERI.5ANN also sent a secret-code

telegram to various G-erraan missions abroad which contained
instructions for putting America in a bad light by means

of propag<'inda therein suggested.

The foregoing is of

signific.'ince as indicating that wide discretionary power was
in fact vested in WOERMANN*S office and that he exercised
the same to an extensive degree.

Reference herein*ifter made

with respect to the charges against WQERI^/iANN as they relate
to the Various countries involved further indicate the wide
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cLiscretionary power vested in WDERMANN»
We come now to a consideration of the charges against
WDERI^iANN with respect to aggressions against Czechoslovakia

(Bohemia and Moravia) .

It appears that on 19 September 1938

WOEI^iANN made a series of suggestions with respect to the

disposition to

be made of the balance of Gzechoslov-tkia

after the Sudeten German question had been disposed of.

It

also appears that on 5 October 1938 \i/OERIvIANN submitted a

memorxndum to Ribbentrop in which he made detailed suggestions

with respect to forthcoming discussions between Hungary and
Czechoslov;tkia.

It further appears that on 12* November 1938

WOERIviANN sent a memor?tndum to defend.-int WEIZSAECKER with

respect to the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem.

In November

1938 we find WGERIiTiANN attending a meeting of the Reich
Defense Council at which time Goering stated that "it was
the task of the Reich Defense Council to correlate all the

forces of the nation for accelerated building-up of the
German armament."

WOERMANN made .a long memorandum relative

to this meeting for Ribbentrop.

On 23 November 1938 we find

defend.'tnt submitting a report to Ribbentrop relating to a
conference which WOERliHANN and General Keitel had had with

respect to the reorganization of the Czech army.

It furl:her

appears that WOERIMNN compiled lengthy notes for -an

anticipated conference relating to a proposed friendship pact
between Germ-uiy and Czechoslov.-tki-a, which notes were submitted

to Ribbentrop.

It appears that during this period WOERI-lfi-NN

was aware of the f,act that the Reich was subsidizing elements
in Czechoslovakia who were seeking help from Germ.any with a

view to inducing Slov;tki.a to bre.-tk av/.ay from

Czechoslovakia.

It further appears that after the invasion of Prague, 15
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March 1939 WOERMANN^S division sent a wire to RITTER,
who was then in Prague, Instructing the seizure of the
cipher office and all materi-al belonging to it in the

Czech Foreign Office.

The foregoing evidence with respect

to \VOERIy!iANh'S activities in connection with Czechoslov.-Jjila
substantiates the claim that his office was not without

considerable .-tuthorlty and power in the shaping of policy
41
N

in many matters. Such evidence does not adequately support
the claim that with respect to the plans for aggression

against Ozechoslov.-ihia the defendant did in fact play a
significant role. The evidence would indicate that he
was advised of what was transpiring.

not indicate, however,

The evidence does

.affirmative acts on his part or

such contributions to the plan or the execution thereof as

to justify finding him guilty with respect to the aggression
against Czechoslov.-ikla.

We come now to .a consideration of the charges against
WOERJMNN with respect to the aggression against Poland.
I t is to be observed that on 4 May 1939, WOERIvIANN sent ,a

secret telegram to the German Consulate In Bratislava,

giving agenda for a military conference to be held between
the Slov.'tkian .authorities and the Germans.

This was obviously

a preparation pointing towards Pol.-tnd, ;and the defendant,
in his exjimination before this Tribunal, while not admitting
it to be such, did admit that the Polish question had then

come into the foreground.

It appears that on 11 May 1939,

WOERIvIANN tr.ansmitted a written order to the German Ambassador

in London, Calling .attention to the fact that the "persecution
of all classes belonging to the Germ,-in minorities In
Polftnd, especially in the former Prussian provinces, has.

-137-

for some considerHble time been on the increnso,'^

He

requested in such communicrLtion that copies of certain
reports inclosed by him, as to such anti-G-orman measures
and methods, and further reports of like nature which would
in the future be submitted, should be made use of in
I

contacts with the British Government.

On 8 July 1939, IVOERI'/lAHN sent rt telegram to a number
of German foreign missions, requesting that they use oert.ain
language and representations with respect to Poland,

On

22 August 1959, a memorandum was sent from the Political

Division (WOERI.'iANN' S division) setting forth the policies
to be followed vjith respect to

England, France and ten

other countries, jn case" of a Polish-German conflict.

The

memorandum goes into comprehensive detail of the steps to be

tciken and representations to be made, .as to those countries.
In discussing this document during the course of examin.ation
before the Tribunal the defendant Indicated that he could not

remember it but stated,
ever,

certainly came from the Political Division."

On 21
and a

"Some of the things it contains, how

August 1939, Legation Councillor Heyden-Rynsch

subordinate of WOSRIvIANN submitted a memorandum to

WOERMANH for his decision with respect to the measures which
the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) would institute

on the date -oreoeding the invasion of Pol.-tnd, such measures
being news blackouts, closing of the frontier, etc.

appears

It

that on 23 August 1939, WOERMAKN took a very decisive

and affirmative step, with respect to the Polish aggression,
in that he sent a top secret telegr.-tm to the German
Legation in Bartlslava, advising the Slovak Government of
reports to the effect that Polish operations against the
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Slovak

border might be expected at any time, and that,

therefore,' to -orotect
Slovakia against surprises, the
i

German government was requesting the- Slovak government to

agree that the Oommander~in~Ghief of the Germ-in army might
avail himself immediately of the Slovak army, for the

protection of Slovakia's northern border, and that the
Comm.'inder-in-Chief of the German Air Force be permitted to

use the Zipser-Neudorf Airfield and, if necess-ary, that he
be permitted to issue a gener'il order to the Slovak air
force, forbidding all aircr-ift to t.-ike off.

In return for

the above "cooperation" requested, the Germans would be
willing, first, to safeguard the frontier against Hungary;
second, to effect the return of the border territory ceded
to Poland in the fall of 1938,

in the event that Poland

waged war against Germ-oiy; and third, to give assur.'inces
that, in case Poland' waged war against Germany, the Slov.-ik
armed forces would not be used outside Slov-akia.

The wire

stated:

"I beg to .'irrange that the Slovak government
give its assent to above-mentioned measures
immediately, and without loss of time."

\70ERIvlANN, on the stand, stated that the document "shows
that i t was not a matter of offensive, but of defensive
measure."

In view of conditions then obtaining in Slovakia,

it was ridiculous to spe;ik. of Pol.-tnd waging war against

Germ-iny, and WOERIIANN'S attempted expl.-in.ation becomes
farcical.

On 28 August 1939, WOERMANN wrote a secret

memorandum stating that Legation
on 27 August,

Councillor Hoffmann had,

c-alled from Br-ttislviVa, informing "us" that

the Slovak Cabinet had accepted the German request to put
all territory at German disposal for the deployment of

German troops.

The defendtmt WOERMANN, on examination on
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9 July 1948, st-'LTiod

th.-it when w.-ir did bre-ik out on 1

September 1939, G-erm-in troop s

.-ictu'illy invaded Poland

through Czechoslovakia.

It appears from the evidence that the so-called

border incidents wore being used by WOERIvlA.NN to put the
responsibility for the outbre.-ik of war on Poland,

significant that on 25

It is

August 1939, defendant WOERI'iA.NN sent

a circular telegram to Germ-m missions in Engl.-ind .-ind France,
requesting tiat all Reich Germans be advised to le.ave the

country by the fastest available means.

It further appears

that on 28 August 1939, the High Command of the German Navy
arranged for the return of all German merchant vessels at

foreign ports to home ports,

which order was to be

tr'insmittod through a telegram bearing \70ERIiANN'S signature,
and Was to bo sent to Germ'in missions abroad.

It is note

worthy th it when Germ.iny finally issued the so-called White
Book, dealing, /traong other things, with the war on Poland,
defcnd'tnt WOERlviANN transmitted such "sVhite Book to Germ.-in

missions abroad through a circular letter of 7 September 1939,
Such letter is in evidence.

This circular letter reveals the

diplomatic tactics employed, and in which WOERIMNN "oartlci-

pated in connection with the aggression -against Pol/tnd,

It

may oe noted therein that one of the methods was to bl.'ime

England,

aid that efforts had been made to neutralize Great

Britain and France with respect to the Polish matter.

Defendant WOERIi/IANN transmitted a telegram to the German

Amoassador in Moscow on 3 September 1939, the contents of which

also are significant in revealing the tactics use preparatory
to the polish invasion.

It is obvious that defendant WOERI'.'ANN

did not, in fact, believe the representations made in such
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I

iiias-

I

communications.

It also appears that he did not believe

the representations which he was m^iking prior to the launch
ing of the invasion of Poland.

In testifying before this

Tribunal on 9 July 1948, he was asked the following question
with respect to the war against Poland;
"Q

In your opinion at that time what nation or
group of nations was responsible for the
outbreak of this war?"

The defendant answered;

"According to my innermost conviction I

held

the opinion that a great part was to be attributed

to Hitler, but not the exclusive responsibility."
During said exronination reference was also made to the
following:

"Q

In this telegram you stated that the full
responsibility was on England for the outbrejik of the war.

Was this theme

to serve

more or less as official guidance for the
Moscow Embassy in their official conver
sations?"

To this question the defend;int answered, "Yes."
Further proof of the fact that defendant knew the
criminal nature of the aims of the G-erm.-ui aggression against

Polftnd appears from a telegr.'on sent by him to the G-erman
Embassy at the Vatican on 13 October 1939.

In this telegr.-im

he states in part;
"There is no question of a return to Posen
in the Case of Cardinal Hlond, who is a fierce
Polish nationalist.
Posen will In the future

undoubtedly form part of the Cermf^ji Reich."'
Finally, on 6 October 1939, and after Polish military
reslst;tnce

had effectu-illy been crushed^ Hitler made a

gesture of a peace offer to the Western Powers,

On 18

October 1939, defendant WOERMANN sent a circular telegr.-im
to a number

of Cerman missions abroad, wherein he instructed

such missions as to the line to follow in discussions with

respect to such oeace offer.

In this letter V/OERI\tANN calls

attention to the fact that when the Finnish Foreign Minister

hal requested the German Minister at Helsinki to inform him,
before his departure for Stockholm, whether any other solution

for ending the war could be suggested from the German side,
the legation at Helsinlci had been given the telegram from
»'

the Reich Foreign Minister:

»

"I request you to state in reply to the

^

question of the Finnish Foreign Minister that
Mr, Chamberlain has rejected in the most shame

less manner the Fuehrer^s generous peace offer,
iind that the matter is now closed, as far as we

^

are concerned,

I request you not to give any

further explan.ations in the matter.

End of

instructions to Helsinki, Request that if
necessary, you use similar language there. WOERJ.iAiNN•"
*

The following postscript appeared on said telegram;
"Berlin, 18 October 1939.
Pol. II 4064 Statement IV.

Foreign Office.

I enclose for your

information copy of instn;,ctions sent by wire
to a rumber of German missions abroad."

The foregoing references to the evidence adduced in this
case, with resoect to Poland, would seem to leave very little

doubt as to the particioation of '.VOERI'i/VNN in the diplomatic

^

preparations for, and in the execution of the aggression
against Polruid.

We come now to the question of the charges against
WOERlvlANN with respect to the aggression against Denmark ;tnd
Norway.

I

It is the opinion of the Tribunal that the evidence

with respect to the charges against WOERlvlANN in this connec

ts

tion is meager and unimpressive.

,

It does not deem that the

evidence vilth respect to these two countries would Justify
a finding of guilt against WOERMNN.
We come next to the charges with respect to the

Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium.

It appears from the

evidence that, early in November 1939, WOERlvlANN was the
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recipient of offici;tl information in'iicating G-erman troop
concentrations on the-Belgian and Dutch frontiers.

It also

appears from the evii-ence that WOERI.IANN, during the same
month of November, was advised of the violation of Holland's

neutrality by Germ,-in aircrfift.
On 13 January 1940,

WOERI^lANN submitted a memorandum

k

to defend.'int WEIZSAECKER, conveying the• information that the

^

Belgian Ambassador desired to call on the State Secretary
in connection with the continued violations of Belgirm
territory by German aircr.aft.

He alludes to the f.act that

r

the Belgi;in Ambassador had complained, but form.-tl complaints
had been unanswered.

>VOEmi/US[N concludes this communic.ation

by stating, "The Luftwaffe operational staff has been .re

quested to give us a plausible explanation for Belgian
consumption."

It should be noted in this connection that

Belgium, at this time, was a neutral country.

The defend;int

admitted in his examination that the Mecheln Incident,
>

which involved the landing of Germ.-oi aircraft near Mecheln

in Belgium, find of which the defendant learned in J/uiuary

t

1940, gave him a "pretty strong hint" that Germany would
attack France "and that this attack would be launched

through Belgium ?-uid Dutch territory,"

It ,'ippe,ars that WOERI'iANN was advised about the Venlo

Incident,
5I

He admits that "it was, of course, somewhat

remarkable that Ribbentrop gave Instructions to the

officials of the Foreign Office concerned, including myself,
that inquiries from the Dutch Government were to be
answered to the effect that the Case h.ad not yet been

cleared up."

It appe-ars from the testimony that on 10 May

1940, the day of the beginning of the militarycperations against

BelglU'Ji)

and Luxembourg, WOERIMNN was instructed

to come to the Foreign Office at 5 o'clock in the morning,
to be available for a conversation with the Luxemoourg

charge d'affaires.

It was during this meeting that a copy

of the Gexmirin declaration of war was h-*inded to such charge

d'affa-ires by WOERIMNN, after the military operations had,
in fact, been started.

A memor.-indum dated 16 May 19,40 written by TOERI14NK
for the State Secretary st.atesJ

•^Today I told the Luxembourg charge d'affaires,
who had called upon rae after previous announcement,
that we now considered Luxemoourg an enemy country
and that therefore he would have to leave. The
rest will be settled by the Protocol Division."
While the evidence hereinbefore referred to would indicate

that defendant WOERiiANN was not without knowledge as to the

criminal plans of the Reich with respect to Holland, Belgium
and Luxembourg, it does not appear that he took part in the
initiation or assisted in the formulation of the plans or

took any affirmative .•i.ction for the consummation of such

pl,ans. We will not, therefore, predicate a finding of

guilt against defendant WOSRI.iANN on account of the alleged
aggression against the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg.
With respect To the charges against WOERMANN in

connection with the aggression against Greece, it does not
apoear that the evidence sustains the charges.

It appears

from the evidence that WOERI/IANN had knowledge of the con

templated Italian invasion of Greece, and it appears that
WOERilAlHl, upon the instructions of the Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs, avoided meeting the Greek Minister who,

appurontly, was seeking information with respect to
mat'cer from the German Foreign Office.

said

A consideration of

all the evidence adduced with respect to the charges against
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WOERMANN in connection i-ith the aggression against Greece

does not satisfy the Tribunal beyond re.asonable doubt that
W0ER]^1AN1J' S acts in connection therewith constitute such

particin-ttion as to render him criminally liable therefor.
The Tribunal considers the evidence with respect to

^

the charges against defendant WOEBI'MNN with respect to
Yugoslavia as being entirely inadequate to sustain a finding

i

of guilty. It does appear that WOERMANN was in the possession
of information with respect to activities which would

indicate that aggression against Yugoslavia was being

contemplt'ited.

The evidence, however, does not show that

WOERliiANN either initiated or implemented the plans for such
' aggression.

Wo come now to the defendant's particip<ation in the
aggression against Russia.

The

Tribunal has ex?inined the

evidence with respect to these charges and does not believe

^

that it Justifies a finding of guilt against defend-'int there
under.

I

Many of the exhibits were of an informational

character advising WOERl/IANN of what was transpiring.

That

the pl'tns originated from him or were subsequently furthered
or implemented by him, or that he assisted materially in the

carrying out of such plans has not adequately been proved to
Justify a finding of guilt

I

against defendant on this charge.

On the evidence adduced with respect to the charges
against WOERl»iANN in connection with the aggresBion against

^

Pol;ind, the Tribunal finds defend/oit GUILTY under Count One.
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HITTER

The defendant HITTER joined the Foreign Office

•prior to 1911, and except for the period from 1914 to
T

192?, rem^^ined in th«t Ministry.

In 1937 he became

Minister to Brazil and was recalled in 1938.

\

He then

received the title of Ambassador for Special Assignments.
In October 1940 he vjas appointed liaison Officer between

^

the Foreign Office and Field Marshal Feitel of the ijehrmacht, which office he held until the fall of 1944.
There is no evidence that he took part in or was

informed of any of Hitler's plans of aggression.

While

his position as jiaison Officer between Hibbentrop and

Feitel was one of substantial imnort'^nce, and his efforts
undoubtedly contributed to the waging of these wars,

there is no proof that he knew that they were aggressive.

Such knowledge is an essential element of guilt.

J

In its

absence, he should be and is ACQUITTED under Count One.

-

136 -

VEE-^Er:HAT5R

The defendant T^liJSE^•^l.'LAY5P,

until long nfter

the l«st of Hitler's aggressions, occupied a minor

position in the K5PPLSR Office during which time,
however, he received several assignments which dealt
with foreign nolitical developments.

He accompanied

the defendant ITE'^^'^LPF to Austria on the letter's

assignment to handle.the Austrian situation un tc
the Austrian Anschluss, and was sent to -Danzig prior
to the invasion of "Poland.

' There is no evidence that he had any knowledge

of Hitler's aggressive nlans, and it is most unlikely

that one holding such a minor position would have been
informed of them.

He should be, and. hereby is ACQUITTED under
Count one.

I

-
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LAIiH^RS

In a'^'iition to the general charges made against all
defendants named in this Count, many specific allegations
are directed therein against the defend,'-int LAIffiiERS.
are to the effect:

These

That LAIvIIERS, with other defendants,

was an active participant in Hitler's seizure of power,
in thiit they marshalled the financial, politic.al, psychological,
and propag-inda support necessary for its success; that LAMLiERS,
xvith other defendants, cloaked the criminal <actlvitles of the

NSDAP with a semolance of legality; that the defend?tnt LMIffiRS,
together with the defendant DIETRICH, coordinated a series of

laws and decrees completely centralizing the control of the

machinery of the G-erman Government in the hands of the Third
Reich; that he oarticipated in the incorporation of conquered
territories into the Gorm-ui

Reich and In the administration

of the incorporated and occupied
furtherance

territories; that he, in the

of the olanning and preparation for aggressive war,

coordin-ated at the highest level the total mobilization of the

I

economic, financial, administrative ;ind military resources of
the Third Reich; that he signed laws -'ind decrees including,
/imong others, the

Reich Defense Law, decrees creating the

Secret Cabinet Council?nd establishing the Ministerial Council

for the Defense of the Reich, and the decree whereby Hitler
assumed personal command of the Wehrmacht; that he further

effected total mobiliz.ation by participation in meetings of the
Reich Defense Council, the Reich

Defense Committee, the General

Council for the Four Year Plan, and the Ministerial Council for
the Defense of the Reich, whereby the military, economic,
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financial, agricultural rinl rearmament phases of mobilization

were accompli shed; that he resolyeji jurisdictional "oroblems
and conflicts as to the respective spheres of competence in
mobilization schemes of various supreme Reich authorities,

and. received, reports regularly from the Plenipotentiary
G-eneral for Economy, from the Plenipotentiary General for

Administration, and the Plenipotentiary General for the Pour

Year Plan; that by virtue of the afores.aid activities /tnd other
wise, the defendant LAlvS-iERS synchronized the economic, financi<'il,

military ;ind administrative preparations with the general

program of aggression;' that

LAM3?5ERS, together with the

defendroits MISSNER and STUCKART ;tnd others, accomp;tnied
Hitler to Prague when German troops marched into Bohemia and

Moravia; that the defend.-mt LAMivIERS, with others, participated

in the secret preparation for aggression against Norway;
that a Fuehrer decree was signed by the defendant LAMliERS

appointing Reichsleiter Rosenberg commissioner for the
centralized control of problems relating to the Soviet

Union trnd other Eastern territories; that LAJJlvIERS signed,

;tmong others, the laws miting Austria, the Free State of
Danzig, Memel, Eupen, Malmedy .and Moresnet with the German
Reich, the decree appointing the Reich Commissioner for

Austri'!., .and legislation extending German civil administration
to Austria, the Sudetenland .and the E.astern territories
(litest Prussia and Posen); that he was responsiole for the

over—all coordination of the incorpor.ation of these terri

tories and p.articip.ated in the appointment of administr-ators
for the perform.ance of the administr.ative tasks involvedo
He participated in the formulation of the law of 13 March
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1938 which united Austria with the Reich; th.at in setting up
G-ermin .tdmini strati on in Austria, ho drafted ;ind signed decrees
which introduced G-erman law and its enforcement by the Gestapo
<and SD, the Nurnberg R.acial Decrees, .-ind the Military Service
Law; that he participated in the formulation of the laws

incorporating into the Reich the Sudetenl.and, Memel, Danzig,
t"

'

the Eastern territories (West Prussia and Posen), and Eupen,
Malmedy and

Moresnet, and in plans for the incorooration

of French territory; that the defendant LAMIiERS signed the
legislation establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and

Moravia .-ind the authority of the German Reich to legislate
in the Protectorate; that he also signed laws extending
H

Gorman administration to the Government General and to the

Occupied Eastern Territories, and signed legislation appointing
administrators in the Protectorate, the Government Gener.al

and other occupied territories, including the apoointment

of Goering as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan in

^

charge of the economic exploitation of the USSR; that he
was further responsible for coordinating with the supreme

^

authorities policies initiated in the occupied territories;
and that he was actively

engaged in the direction and

^

administration of these territories.

There is much evidence in the record which clearly

shows that the defendant LAMI.iERS, .as Reich Minister and Chief

of the Reich Chancellory, occupied a position of influence

and authority

»

through which he collaborated with .and greatly

helped Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy in their various plans
of agP^ression .-md exoansion.

In our treatment rf other counts
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herein, particulnrly Count Six, we hnve o-tlle'i attention to
evidence which indicates that LMil-ERS held and exercised wide

discretionary powers.

The evidence herein alluded to in our

tre itment of the charges against LAMLiERS under Count One also
deraonstrtates the exerciee of discretion and power oy LAiOJERS*
in the formulation and furtherance of Nazi plans and acts of
criminal aggression.

It appears from hAM^iERS^ own testimony before this
Tribunal on 9 September 1948 that as early as 1936 he was
Called in by Hitler and G-oering in connection with the
Institution of the Four Year Plan. While he disclaims having

drafted the -provisions of the Pour Year Plan, he admits, "On
the whole it was most comprehensive in its wording, and I
edited the draft

in some form or other outside of the

conference that took olace between the Fuehrer and G-oering;

that continued in conference.'.'

While^ he denies having

contributed .'inything of decisive importance to this very

important plan, the fact th;it he was Called in by the
/

orinci-pal architects of the scheme

indicates gr.aphically

how dependent they were upon him for the proper formulation
and efficient implementation of that ;ind following schemes,

and it a-ppears that following this event, on countless
oco?.:Lsions of gre-at importance, he was instrumental in

transl.iting into decrees .'tnd ordinances t.he wishes .and pl.-ois
of Hitler and Goering in connection with the Nazi -program

pert'lining to aggression against other countries.
It appe.ars that on 22 October 1936 Goering issued a
decree which w.as designated as "Decree on the Execution
of the

Four Year Plan."

This decree created a committee

of ministers who were designated as lesser council ministers,
and who were to collaborate in the m.'iking of "fund.'unental
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decisions."

On such committee

were placed the Reich Ministers

of W-nr, Finance, Economics, Food, Prussi.an Minister of Finance,
Reich Minister KEHRL, Dr. Ing, KEPPLER, who was gener.al erpert
for the general procurement of raw and synthetic m.aterials,

-tJid

the Staf-e Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellory, who w.'-is,

of course, defendant LAIiG^lERS.
L.^XP1RS'

It appears that subsequently

subordinate, \Viluhn, became <a member of the General

Council so that he could Inform defend.ant LAMIERS "at any

time of the measures we have introduced."

From the evidence

in the record it is clear that the General Council to which
we have- made reference became a very imnortant and active

agency for certain ohases of planning in connection with
subsequent invasions, and other aggressions.

Under date of 4 September 1938 there was issued the
so-called Reich Defense Law which was signed by Hitler,

Goerlng, Hess, Frick, Walter Funk, Ribbentrop, Keitel and

defendant LA&BjiERS.

It is significant that in a note appended

to the law on said date, which note was signed by Hitler, and
LAMMERS as Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory,

it was provided that the publication of the so-called Reich
Defense L;tw, which had been on said day signed, should be
suspended.

LAIvII'.iERS on the witness stand could m;tke no

satisfactory expl<'itnation for the secrecy placed upon the decree
thus made.

It appears that the secrecy limitations on the said

law were lifted by Hitler late in 1939.

The defendant LAl'iHiERS

testifying before the Tribunal on 22 September 1948,
professed to have learned this only from the minutes

of a meeting in which

Goering had announced that the

secrecy no longer applied.

It Is significant that

defendant LAIvLIERS played :ai active role in this defense
council, in connection with other high representatives of the
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Reich.

It appears that a Reich Defense Committee was set up

for the purpose of preparing decisions for the Reich Defense
Council and otherwise facilitating the work of the Council

and coordinating its work with the armed forces, the Party,

and principal Reich authorities.

Such Reich Defense Committee

was composed of the High Command of the" Armed Forces (OKW),
the deputy of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, and

the leading staffs of the Pleniootentiary for Reich Adminis

tration (GBV) and the Plenipotentiary for War Economy (GBW),
and Reich defense officials.

LAICIERS managed to have

his

ministerial director, Kritzinger, made a permanent representa
tive on such Reich Defense Committee.

The defendant's efforts

to minimize the work of the Reich Defense Council is unworthy

of consideration.

It appears that at the first meeting of

the Reich Defense Council, which was hold 18 November 1938

and following the Pact of Munich, and at which, according to
the memorandum relating to said meeting which is in evidence,
"all Reich ministers .and state secretaries, with a few

exceptions, were present" as were /ilso the commanders in chief
of the Army, the Navy, and the chiefs of the General Staff
of the three br.^uiches of the armed forces, SS Gruppenfuehror

Heydrich, the President of the Reich Labor Office, and others.
Goering, as chairman of the meeting, stated that the tjisk of
the Reich Defense Council' was that of correl-ating ""all the
forces of the nation for accelerated building up of the

German arm.-anent." The defendant LAMI^ERS, in the course of his

testimony before the Tribunal on 28 September 1948, professed
uncertainty as to whether or not he hf^id attended such meeting.
When asked as to whether, as a permanent member of the Reich '
Defense

Council, he would have had a representative there if

he himself was not present, he gave the ridiculous explanation
that, "I don't know oecause I

to be meetings of the

never considered these meetings

Reich Defense Council,"

A second meeting of the Reich Defense Council appears'
to have been held pn 2^ June 1939, a few weeks before the
invasion of Poland^

LAliiU.iERS admits that he himself was

present and took a part in this meeting. The minutes of said
meeting state;

"Ministerial President, General Field Marshal

Goerlng emphasizes, in a "orertmble, that according
to the Fuehrer's wishes the Reich Defense Counsel

was the determining body in the Reich for all
questions for preparations for war."
In the light of this statement by Goerlng, the efforts of

^

LAMiSRS in testifying before this Tribunal to minimize the
significance of the Reich Defense

Council or to intimate

that it was non-existent become doubly ludicrous.

It is

important to note also that Goering indicated in this meeting

that the Rclch Defense

^

Council was to discuss only the most '

important questions of Reich defense as they would bo worked
out by the Reich Defense

^

Committee.

As hereinbefore

indie,ated LAMB/ERS had his representative, Kritzinger, on the
Reich Defense Committee.

The minutes of this meeting also indicate the
comprehensive nature of their war preparations.

In evidence

is a copy of what was knoivn as the mobilization book for civil

administration issued by Koitel of the Armed Forces High
Oomm/tnd ,and consists of general directions as to the measures
,

to be t,:iken in case of mobilization and emphasizes the
cooperation expected from the civilian authorities.

It is

significant that Paragraph 14 thereof provides;

"In order that any new me,asure should be included
in a mobilization schedule for the civil adminis

trative authorities application must be made to the
Chief of the Reich Defense Committee,"

The defendant, in the course of his examination before this
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Tribunal, on 22 September.1948, admitted that the Reich
Defense Committee referred to in s.-iid Seption 14 is the

same Reich Defense Committee v^herein'he, LAMi.IERS, had a
representative, .-uid that such representative was Ministerial

Director Kritzinger.
It is important to note that the memor.-uidum relating
to the first.meeting of the Reich Defense Council on 18
November 1938 also states;

"Additional tasks of Reich Defense

Council:

new formulation of all wartime legislation."

That the Reich Defense Council did pl.-iy a significant role
in the prepfiration of war laws and war decrees is further
established by other evidence in the record.

A Hitler decree was issued on 30 August 1939, only
two days oefore the invasion of Poland.

This decree bears

Hitler's, Goering's and defendant LAMiERS' signatures.

This

decree purported to establish a flo-called Ministerial Council k

for Reicn. Defense. The defend'Uit in the course of his testimony
before this Tribunal, on 22 September 1948, admitted that such
ordinance was "worked on" by him and then it was submitted to

other agencies and then submitted to Hitler for his signature.
The defendant stated that it had been drawn up in accordance
}

with Hitler's instructions.

During such examination before

the Tribunal the defendant was asked with respect to this
decrees

"Well, then the date of the decree, 30 August
1939, wasn't merely coincidental was it, thfit
it was issued two days before the beginning of
the war?"

To this question the defendant answered as follows;

*^0, the tension with Poland which prevailed
was extraordinarily great at that time, ;tnd there
Was the threat of war."

On the Sfjjne day, in the course of his examination, the
defendant was asked the further question with respect to
t h i s decree:

^

•^Well now, you were the administrative expert for
Hitler.
Prom what you say now, in view of that
fact, Was it you who suggested that they form the
Ministerial Council for the Reich's Defense, or
did Hitler, .a man completely naive in matters of
administration, dream that up himself?"
To this the defendant answered:

""I did not make that proposals It emanated from
Goering and from Hitler himself, who called me land
said that now some such organization would have to

^
oe created in simolified form for swift and efficient

legislation during the war,"
The examination continued as follows:

•

"Q,

Well, now, Rlboentrop was not a member of the
Ministerial Council, was he?

"A

No,

"Q

And yet you Informed Ribbentrop, did you not,
that you would give hira information corcerning
drafts of decrees which were to bo passed by
the Ministerial Council, didn't you?

"A- Thcat's correct. The Poreigh Minister was
deliberately not included in this Ministerial
. Council for the Defense of the Reich.

I t was

of great im-oortance to him to belong to it, and
indeed, I presented that subject to the Puohrer,
who declared that thuit was not necessary,
I
then consoled Ribbentrop by telling him that

I would inform him if matters came up affecting
foreign policy,"
The foregoing indicates not only wi*ch certainty that the
Ministerial Council for Reich Defense was created for the

specific purpose of waging war against Poland, but also

indicates the tremendously important role played by LAMlvERS

in the formulation of legislation pertaining to the aggressive
plans of Hitler.

It is significant in this connection that

the defend int, at an earlier p0int in his examination on 22
September 1948, stated with respect to the Ministerial
Council for Defense of the Reich as follows:
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"And I was the member in charge, the man who

conducted the proceedings.''
The examination then proceeded as follows;
"Q

Now there were only six members on that Council,
isn't that right?

"A

That is right.

"Q

And they were all Higher Reich Authorities,
weren't they?

"A

Yes, they were prominent Reich Authorities,
particularly since they represented many
other departments also, the Plenipotentiary
General for Administration, the Plenipotentiary
Gener?il for Economy; I had no one to represent.

"Q

Now this Ministerial Council was a legislative
body and could issue any legal decrees insofar
as they were not explicitly left to the
Reichstag or the Cabinet, isn't that right?

"A

Its sole task was that of promulgating
ordinances with the force of law."

There would seem to be small need to discuss further the

claim of the defendant LAMVERS to the effect that his role in

the formation of legislation in implementation of Hitler's

aggressive war program was a negligible one.
admissions indicate the contrary.

His own

The record discloses a

great number of wartime decrees and ordinances promulgated

by this organization.

It appears that the first meeting of

this Ministerial Council met on 1 September 1939, and it

appears that the defendant LAMMERS was present.

At such

meeting it appears that 14 separate decrees were ratified.

Subsequent meetings held by the Ministerial Council likewise
ratified m^uiy wartime decrees, many of them criminal in
purpose.

The foregoing references indicate the great importance
and influence of the defendant lAMJaERS in the higher Nazi

circles in the distinctly policy-making sphere.

It further

indicates his great activity and contribution to the further

ance and implementation of the Nazi aggressions against other

countries generally.

\?e will now touch briefly upon his

participation in the plans, preparations of, /ind exeeution of

the specifically named

invasions and wars of aggression

involved in the charge.

It appears that LAI'B'iERS became involved in the Austrian

question at ?in early date. We find that on 30 September 1937
he wrote a letter to make arrangements for the presence of
defendant KEPPLER at a meeting to be held between the Landsit'

leiter of the Party for Austria, one Leopold, and Hitler,

It

appears from the defendant's testimony before this Tribunal,

*

given on 22 September 1948, that he knew the circumstances
leading up to the invasion of Austria.
On 23 April 1938 subsequent to the so-called Anschluss^
a Fuehrer decree was issued, co-signed by LMO^IERS, appointing

•%

a

Reich Commissioner for the reunion of Austri.a with the

Germain Reich.

Under date of 14 April 1939 we find a cabinet'

law issued for the administration of Austria, signed by
Hitler, Frick, Hess, Goering, defend,ant VON KROSIGK, and

defend.-jit DR. LABIMERS.

^

Subsequently, on 15 March 1940,

another Fuehrer decree, co-signed by LAMI/IERS, w.as issued
which termincated the office of the Reich Commissioner in

^

Austria, ;md on 18 June 1941, a decree signed by LAI-OffiRS
introduced Hitler Youth legislation into Austria, which
provided for Nazi control and Indoctrination of Austri.-ui youth.
While some of the foregoing events indie.*ite knowledge

of plans ;:md preparations against Austria, they do not
indicate that LAJilviERS played ;in active role in the formulation

or implement,ation of such pl.-tns.
*

Acts of defend;tnt subsequent

to the so-called Anschluss with reference to the administra

tion of the seized territory are not of such character .as to

Justify a finding of guilt against the defend-ait LAMMERS
under the charges m.ade .against him with respect to Austria*
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We will now consicleT' the charges and evidence v/ith

respect to Czechoslov;^iar

It appears that after the Munich

Pact LAMI'xERS took an active part in the plans and preparations

for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and it appears that

he was present with Hitler, Frank, Frick, the defendant
STUCKART, Himmler,. Heydrich, and others, in the meeting with
President Hacha of Czechoslovakia in Berlin on 15 March 1939,
at which time, according to the judgment of the International

Military Tribunal, Vol. I, p. 197;
^The defendant G-oering added the threat that he
would destroy Prague completely from the air.

Faced by this dreadful alternative H-icKa and his
foreign minister put their signatures to the

necessary agreement at four-thirty in the morning,
tind Hitler and Ribbentrop signed it on behalf of
Germany.

Immediately thereafter the de'fend.-int LAMI/IERS, with other

prominent Nazis, proceeded to Prague to assist in c.arrying
out the aggression against Czechoslov.-ikia.

LAIvSvIERS, in his

examination before this Tribunal, professed ignor.-mce as to
I

their objectives when the train in which he was traveling on
15 March 1939 proceeded towards Czechoslov.-ikia.

It is

significant that immediately after arriving in Prague it was
the defend.'int LAI^EiERS, acting with the defend.-int STUCKART,
who drafted the decree est-..blishing the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia.

This decree is dated 16 March 1939.

0

Such decree was signed by Hitler, Frick, Ribbentrop and
LAMLIERS.

The terms of this decree indicate the utter

Callousness of the Nazi hierarchy in thd carrying out of their

aggressive plans against we.ker nations.

Professions were

made therein to the effect that Bohemia and Moravia were

being protected and that such Protectorate was autonomous

and should govern itself.

Subsequently, however, a decree

was issued on 23 June 1939, signed by Hitler, Frick, and the

defend-int LAIAMERS, which, ?imong other things, provided;
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^1.

The Reich Protector is .uuthorized to decree
amendments cf the autonomous law inasmuch as

necessitated oy common interests.

"2.

In Cases where delay proves dangerous, the
Reich Protector may decree any kind of legal

regulations." (Emphasis suppliedT]
Subsequently, on 7 May 1942, another decree was issued, signed

by Hitler and the defend-uit LAliMERS, which empowered the Reich
Protector "to take appropriate measures as determined by that
edict," meaning the decree establishing the Protectorate of

16 March 1939, in agreement with the Reich Minister of the

Interior, in order to adapt the administration to the conditions
prevailing in each case and to issue provisions necessary

thereto. The foregoing references certainly indicate knowledge
of and participation in the plans for the invasion of

Czechoslov.-ikia, that is, Bohemia and Moravia, ?md participation
in the formulation and carrying out of policies in BohemiaMoravia after the invasion thereof.

Turning now to the question of LAI®aERS' participation'
in the aggression against Poland, it appears that as early as

15 June 1939 LAIviliERS received from

Schickedanz, who was a

lieutenant of Rosenberg*s of the Foreign Affairs Office, a
communication dealing with the Jewish question jn Pol;tnd,
Said communication commenced with the st.atement:

"I am enclosing the plan for the East."

It is noteworthy that subsequently Schickedanz becMme LAMJ/iERS'
deputy with the G-overnor General for the occupied Polish

territories.

In testifying before this Tribunal on 22

September 1948 LAJAMERS sought to minimize the signific.-ince
of having Schickedanz as his representative with the Govemoi?

Gener.'tl for the occupied Polish territories by asserting:

"He wasn't my representative either, I sent
him there simply to give him a job and gave
him the task of observing because questions
in the Government General interested me."
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Such explanation appears to oe sham ;inl frivolous, and
in this s.ame category c.*^ be placed the greater part of his

expl.'in.ations .-aid excugeg as disclosed oy the testimony with
respect to Poland, and the plans, preparations aid other
activities in connection therewith which show defendant,

involved.

We now- call attention to the following significant
V

exhibits in evidence:

a

decree signed by Hitler, Prick, Hess,

G-oering, Ribbentrop .and defend.-ait LAIiii^RS, dated 1 September
1939, and which provides for the reincorporation with the
Reich of the free state of Danzig; a decree dated 8 October

1939, signed by Hitler, Goering, Prick, Hess and defendant
LMItffiRS, and relating to the annexation of the Eastern

territories and incorporating the Polish territory into the
Reich, and containing various provisions with respect to
the administration thereof; a decree dated 12 October 1939,

signed by Hitler, and co-signed by a nvxaoer of other high
Nazi officials, including defendant LAili-iERS, which decree

appointed Dr. Pr.ank as Governor Generril of the occupied
Polish territories; .a decree signed by Hitler, Prick .and

LAliiiJJRS, dated 20 October 1939, relating to the adminis
tration .:xnd org.-iniNation of the E.astern territories; a
decree dated 2 November 1939, signed by Hitler, Prick and

LAMIJERS relating to the administrative structure of the Eastern
\

territories by providing that the Reich G.au, West Prussia,
should henceforth be c.tlled the Reich Gau Danzig, West

Prussia; a "decree dated 29 January 1940^ signed oy Hitler,
Prick, .'Old defendant LAI^.IERS, amending .a decree of 8-October
on the org.aniz.ation and administration of the Eastern

territories; and a decree d.ated 7 May 1942, signed by Hitler
and defend.ant

relating to the establishment of

the State Secret.ariat for Security Affairs in the Government
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General and which contained, among other things, the
provision,
l^The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police is authorized to give the State Secretary

for Security Affairs direct orders in the fields
of security and the strengthening of the German
nationality. "

and a further paragraph therein contains this significant
provision,

"In Cases of disagreement between the Government
General and the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police, my decision is to be obtained

through the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellory."

Prom the foregoing it is obvious that the knoivledge

and participation of the defendant LAIJIiERS with respect to
the aggression against Pol'-J^d was far from being merely
perfunctory.

That the defendant LAI'£IP]RS continued to play

an important role in the formulation of legislative matters

pertaining to Pol,and appears from the •follov/ing orosecution
exhibits:

An exhibit cont.aining a telegram from Governor

General Prank to LAMLERS which shows LAMiERS was being

consulted with respect to import.ant matters of policy
pert-lining to Poland .and that he was m-iking vit.al

suggestions in the formulation of policy in respect thereto.
Another prosecution exhibit is a decree of 7 M,ay 1942, signed
by Hitler and the defendant LAlvliERS, pertaining to the adminis
tration of the Government Gener,al.

This decree .also indic.ates

that in the event of differences between the Government General

and the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief cf German Police a decision

was to bo obtained from Hitler through the Reich Minister
and Chief of the Reich Chancellory who w.as defendant

LAMIERS.

Another slgnific-int prosecution exhibit is a decree

dated 27 May 1942, sighed by Hitler and defendant LAI/lIvERS,

relating to the appointment, transfer /uid dismissal of civil
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servants within the rire.-i of the jurisi-iction of the Government
General•

The criminal participation by lefenlant LAl.iIiSRS in the

criminal aggression of the Reich against Polanl we consider
established beyond a

reasonable doubt.

We now come to n

consideration of the evidence adduced

in connection with the charges ag-ilnst defend:int LAJ/l!5ERS

reltLtive to the part he is alleged to have played in
connection with the inv<asions of Denm:trk and Norway.

The

evidence reveals that LAiiuERS, at an early date, had knowledge
of and became involved in the plans and preparations for the
invasion of Norway.

It appears that as early as December.

1939 Schickodanz wrote to LAIil ERS, which communication
contained notes on a lecture.

Such notes m.ade reference to

a suggestion by Admiral Raeder on the importance of Norway
in the war, and also related to a

conference of 16 December

1959 which had been attended by Quisling, the Norwegian

^

traitor.

Said communication

clearly indicates that there

were plans afoot for t.-ilcing action against Norway.

Before

r-

leaving such communication we wish to call attention to the

following pjiragraph contained therein:
'IProm the beginning planning of a political

centra,! agency which properly ev-duates in
adv.-tnce the coming difficulties and the
exception.al situation. Politic'd head as near
as possible to the decisive place to avoid any

del'iys Caused by the participation of sevor-d

dc-oartments and'possible to reach fast decisions.

Therefore best Reich Chancellory direct, but

completely c.-unouflaged by respective measures.
Exclusion of the Foreign Office from the case,

only Reich Foreign Minister to be kept Informed
in order not to burden this office.'^
Under date of 24 April 1940, and immediately following

the invasion of Norw'ty, .-l decree was issued, signed by

Hitler, Goering, Keitel, Frlck, and the defend-oit LAMivIERS,

which decree appointed Terboven Reich Commissioner of Norv/ay
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ancl cont/dnea. many provisions with respect to the government
of invaded Nor^vay. Article 8 of such decree is significant
and re.-ids

as follows:

"Regulations for the implementation and supple
mentation for this decree will be

issued in the

civilian sector by the Reich Minister ani. Chief
of the Reich Chancellory and in the military

sector by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command
on the basis of my directives."
Again we must remind ourselves that the Reich Minister and
the Chief of the Reich Chancellory there referred to is none
other than the defend-uit LAIvii.iERS.

On 31 May 1940 LAMMERS

directed a letter to care of Reichshauptamtsleiter Schickedanz^
stating among other things as follows:
"As rev^ard for your activity as my plenipotentiary
with the Governor Gencr.-il of the Occupied Polish
Territories and with the Reich Commissioner for

the Occupied Norwegian Territories I allotted to
you for the period from 1 J-jiuary to the end of
May of this year a lump sum which, in view of the cuts
in Salaries, amounts to altogether 7,100 RM."

It appears further that in June 1940 L.AMiJERS again wrote
Schickedanz st.ating:

"As Reich Commissioner Torboven informs me he has
noiY established the liaison office planned by him

in Berlin.

You will learn .all details from the

copy of my enclosed circular. May I express to
you my gratitude for your activities as leader
of the temporary liaison office at the Reich
Chancellory."

Further documentary evidence reveals LAImERS' close

connoction and participation in the plans of the invasion of
Norway both before and after s.-one was commenced, and in the

oocup.ation that followed.

Among ,the exiiiblts that are of

special significance is Torboven^s report to Hitler as of
22 July 1940 which was submitted through L-AliiMERS.

This

re'oort, among other things, shows the p.art that Quisling
played in cooperation with the Germans leading up to the
invasion of Norway.

In evidence is a mcmor;mduin on a
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conference that took place bet^veen Hitler, Quisling, Martin
Bormann,

Relchfimtsleiter Sohellt .-^tnl the lefenlant LAl'iLiERS

on 16 August 1940.

This oxhibit_ establishes L-W^IiJERS'

knovilelge .-inl participation
Norwas^

as to the aggression against

Introlucel in evidence is a letter from Terboven

to lefenlant LAIl.EHS, latel 17 October 1940.

This letter

encloses a reoort on the activities of b.ne Commi'ssioner for

the Morivogi:tn Occupied. Territories from April to the l-tte of
the communication.

A lecree datel 18 Decemoer 1941, signel

by LAMtERS as Reich Minister an-i Chief of the Reich

Chancellory, is in evidence, which lecree estaolishe'l a
Central Bureau for the Occupie'l Horwogi-in Territories anl
appointed lefonlant STUCKART as chief of such bureau.

Also

in evllonce is a file note from lefenl-oit WEIZSAECKER to

lefenlant TOERMANN ^vhich encloscl a letter from LAI'lERS to

Quisling, l-.tel 17 September 1948, which letter, -imong
other things, states that Hitler hal conclulel to oostpone
final lisoosition of Gorman-Norwegian relations until after

the w-r anl that in the meantime Nor^-ray's interests abroal
//

were to be ro-oresentel only oy>

"the comoetent

LUthorities of the Reich, that

is, in relation to the Reich Govemnent through

the Reich Commissarj in tne occupie'l territories

through the chiefs '-'>f the Ger;-ian almlnistr'ition
in these territories, anl in countries on a

-'rion-lly footing with us through the -liplociatic

Reich representatives maintaino'l there or through
the Foreign Office."
He further states:

"When Norwegian interests in the occupie'l
territories an-l a'oro i,l are concernol, the
Reich Commissar wishes that the competent
German authorities employ Norwegians, who are
members of the NS or closely oonnectel with it,
as consult-jits. If matters have not hitherto
oeen hanlle-1 in this way, I shall .arrange for

the necessary steps to oe t'tken in this lirection. "
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The foregoing evidence, hs heretofore in-iic-'Lte'i,
est.Jolishes bcyonh u re tsonn'ole 'iou'ot the criminal

particip.-^tion of LAI.1I'-:ERS in the prepar i-tions le.-thing up
to Norway's invasion, ani. in the suhsequent aclministration
of the occupied country.

There is very little evidence showing LAMi'ERS'
participation in .the invasion and subsequent administration
of Denmark. There is one exhibit, which is a Reich

Chancellory memorandum dealing with the oosition of the

German Plenipotentiary in Denmark.

Here defendant LAMhERS

states that the new German Plenipotentiary in Denmark, while

no longer a diplomatic representative, nevertheless belonged

to the Foreign Office.

He recommends that the Reich Labor

Leader address a roouest he has In ' lind to the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory.

This document

by itself would not Justify a finding against LAIvIIiERS with
respect to the invasion and occupation of Denmark.
We come now to a discussion of the charges against

LAIliERS with respect to Belgium, Holland .-uid Luxembourg.
The record contains evidence to show that in J;uiuary 1940
a Fuehrer Decree was issued relating to "the preparation

for the occup.ation of territories outside of Germany."
It is signific-'iTit that a h -.ndwritten footnote on this
letter states that:

"The Fuehrer has approved the decree, but ordered

that it is to be issued by the Chief of the Reich
Chancellory.

We are to receive copies for

distribution as surp^'ested above."
It is also significant that a memorandum in said exhibit,
i

from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, reads in part
as follows:
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"MemorM.n4uin Concerning Fuehrer Decree on MHlnten-ince
of Secrecy

"Accori-ing to an announcement by Ministerlalrat
Director Kritzinger, the Fuehrer Decree of 29
January 1940 has been forwarlel in writing only
to Fiell Llarshal Goering, the Fuehrer's leputy,
anl the Reich Minister of the Interior. To the

remaining ministers the 'lecree was -innounce*!
orally by Reich Minister LAJ\;IiiERS."
It shoull be notel that the foregoing exhibit contains
evidence which clearly indicates that the countries ^^hich
^

it Was -olannei. to occupy were the countries of Belgium,
Hollanl an'i Luxembourg.

It appears that on 31 J;inuary 1940 'iefeni.ant LAMIIERS
forwarlel to Keltel a photostat of the decree as approved by
Hitler on 29 J.-aiuary.
before this Tribunal

While the

defendant in cross-examination

stated that the final decree was in

absolute conformity with the draft, he admitted that he was
not allowed to change the subject natter of the decree that

had been appi^oved by Hitler and that,
"Such a decree imposing the obligation to
observe secrecy must have been enacted."
It should be noted that the foregoing decree w^s issued more

than three months prior to the invasion of the countries of
Belgium, Holland -ind Luxembourg.

In the light of his obvious

knowledge, and in view of the participation of LAI-IIERS in the

handling of the foregoing decree, no time need be soent.in
consideration of LAMiJ^RS' representations to the effect that

contemplured military operations were not imparted to the
civilian officials,

A decree was issued on 18 M-y 1940, following the
invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, which

invasion took place on 10 M-ay 1940, which decree was
signed by Hitler, Goering, Keltel, Frick and the defend-ait
LAM.^ERS.

This decree orovided for the execution
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of -oower by the government in the Lowl.'inls.

Paragrnph 1

st.-ites in part:

"The Occupied

Dutch Territories will be

subordinated to the Reich Commissioner for

the Occupied Dutch Territories."

Paragraph 7 of such decree contains the following:
"Regulations for the execution and completion

i

C

of this decree will be issued according to my
directives for the civilian sphere by the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
.'ind for the milit/try sphex'e by the Chief of

the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,"

Under date of 21 May 1940 MAlvl^RS transmitted to the
Reich Minister a letter enclosing a decree of the Fuehrer

^

signed by Hitler and LAIiMSRS, which announced the appointment
of Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Reich Coramisslorler for the Occupied
Netherland Territories .-ind provided for the government of

Said territory.

It specifically empowered Field Marshal

Goering to issue directives within the limits of the duties

incumbent upon him as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan,

t

It also provided that "this decree is not to be published,"
The evidence above referred to,

and evidence in the

\

t

record, not spocifically mentioned herein, Indicates clearly

that LAM: ERS was a criminal purticip?int in the plans and
preparations for the invasion of and aggression against
I

Belgium,

Holland and Luxembourg, and In the Reich's adminis

tration of Said countries after their invasion.

We come now to the question of LAM-,ERS' orLrticipation

In the plans and preparations for aggression against Russia.
In testimony before this Tribunal the defendant was Inclined

to disclaim /tny real knowledge of the plans ag tinst Russia,
He admitted.
"To be sure every once in a while I had certain
inner misgivings."
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an-a he inliCMtel that he hai. hlscusseh the matter with the
Fuehrer who hai. told him that he feared Russia was going to

attach G-ermany.

He claimed that he believed such statements.

He admitted .-aso that there had been talh of a Germ.an
preventive war,

"But there was no single word said to me that

such a preventive war was being planned and
prepared for."
The defendant, in an ex.-onination before this Tribun.al on 13

September 1948, stated;
"I tnoh part only in Rosenberg^s prepar.;ition
for the organizational side of the civilian

administration to be set up in the event of
the outbre.'tk of war,.'.."

On 20 April 1941 ;.l decree, signed by Hitler .-tnd LAlC^iERS,

, appointed Rosenberg as Hitler's deputy "for the rontral
control of questions connected with the East Eurooean

region."

It is significant that this document contains a

note stating,

"The Fuehrer signed the above document at Fuehrer
headquarters on his birthday, that is 20 April
1941, after' telephone communication with Dr.
LAFIERS. "

\

A oart of this orosecution exhibi? is a letter of LAi€IERS.*
dated 21 April 1941, to Funli, Reich Minister for Economy,

enclosing the decree mentioned.^

In this letter the

defendant states that,

"Rosenberg has been asked to m-ike all necessary
preparations as soon as possible in oase of a
possible state of emergency. The Fuehrer has
authorized Rosen'oerg to call on the Supreme Reich
Authorities for their closest cooperation for

this purpose, to obtain Information from them,
and ;dso to summon the deputies of the Supreme
Reich Authorities to meetings.

In order to

guarantee secrecy of the commission and of the
necessary 'oreparations in this state, only these
Supreme Reich Authorities are to be informed.
On this cooperation Relchsleiter Rosenberg has
chiefly to rely. That is, in accordance ivith the
Fuehrer's wish I should like to ask you to place
yourself at the disposal of Relchsleiter Rosenberg
for the execution of his task.
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...

"In the interest of secrecy it woul'i be .-I'lvis-Lble

if you woull appoint n -ieputy ;xt your office who
alone would communioate with the Reichsleiter's
office and who alone, apart from your permanent

deputy, should be informed of this letter."
Such letter was sij^ned by defendant LAM^iERS,

It appears that on 21 April 1941 the defendant LA1'II!ERS
sent a letter of similar tenor to Field Marsh-il Keitel.

Such'

letter states, among other things, that the particular

individu;as upon whom Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily
depend are,

"The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, the
Reich I/Iinister of Economics, and you, yourself."

Prom Rosenberg^s files we have in evidence a memorandum
that recites, among other things, that LAl.'ii-iijRS and Rosenoerg

had -agreed to sugt':;est to the Fuehrer that he n;tme a Reich
Minister and General Protector for the Occupied Eastern
Territories.

It then states:

"Herewith a propos/tl which has ^oen dr.afted oy

Dr. LAMiiERS ana. discussed with the undersigned."
Other exhibits introduced in evidence further indicritc
defendant LAJJ/IiiERS' active participation in the plan of

aggression against Russia and in the carrying out thereof.
Particular attention is called to a letter from
to LAiru.ERS under date of 13 June 1941.

Rlbbentrop

It is significant

that such letter states in part,

"It is evident that the impending events will

bring about political movement all over the East,
The territory occupied by German troops will
border on most sides on foreij^n states ^vhich

will very much -affect their interest,"

This was only several days before the invasion of the Soviet

territory.

Three weehs after the invasion of Russia it

-..ppe-ars that EAT^IERS -attended a conference at Hitler's field
headquarters, together with Rosenoerg, Goering, Keitel, and
Bormann,

This conference concerned the contemplated

inoorooration of all Baltic regions.
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.From the evi'lence .-.tdluce^ in support of the ch.-irges

^

ag.'dnst the defend.-tnt LAlm;iERS under this Count, with
respect to the M.lleged .tcts of .wggresslon /ig.-iinst
Czechoslov^ikia, Poland, Norw.-iy, Holl:ind, Belgium, Luxembourg
nnd Russl.-i, it is estrtblished beyond u reasonable doubt that
the defendant LAMhERS was a criminal particip.ant in the

formulation, implementation and execution of the Reich's
plans and -oreoarations of aggression against those countries.
We find the defendant LAMJiERS GUILTY under Count One,

»
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Until Himmler was appointed Uinirter of the

Interior, 'n 1943, the defendant FTUGK"-APT wae not a

Peoret^ry of Ptate in th^^t Ministry, but v^es the respon
sible chief of one of its principal sections.

During

that period, hov/ever, he bore the ^honorary title of State
Secretary, carried over from that position which he held
in another Ministry.

He war not present at any of the Hitler conferences

in which plan*^ for aggressive wars v'ere proposed and disjb

cussed.

After these p.ggres<=ions took niece he occupied

many resronsible noFitions in the administration of the

occunied territories, and dr'^fted or assisted in the prenaration of decrees related to them, and of the treatment
of their inhabitants as well as ^^nti-Semitic legislation

which was adonted in the Peich, and extended to the occu
pied territories.

Fe narticipated in tbe preparation

of the Reich Defence law of 4 Se^'tember 193S,

and as

Frick'p Staff T.eader, acted as Chairman of the meeting
and explained the nrovirions of that law and was himself
a. member of the Reich Defense Committee,

In l^ay 19Z9 he

was present at a conference in which the economic use

and exploitation of the territories which might be occu
pied as a result of war was discussed; he received and

aresumably was familiar with the general mobilization
^lans.

"'••.'e

have reviewed the evidence and the claixa of

the nrosecution based thereon, but h"ve been unable to

-

16S -

—

.1

'I iWi

find and oar attention haF not been directed to any
evidence that he had knovledge of theae aggreesions
or that he planned, prepared, initiated or vaged
theae wara.

'^•hether

what he did constituted v;ar

crimes or crimes against humanity will be discussed

when we discuss those counts of the Indictment, but
we deem that his guilt under Count One of the Indict

ment is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and we
therefore j^C^UIT him under

^

that Count.

.

t
>

-
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DAPPE

/

While

the

defendant DAPPE was

the Peich Minister

for Pood and Agrioulture and head of the Peich Food
Estate from the seizure of oov'er until his removal from

office, and was therefore a member of the Reich Cabinet,
he never attended any of the conferences at which Hitler

disclosed his plans of aggression, and there is no evi-

,dence that he was informed of them, with the following

I

excertion, namely:

^

A letter which he wrote to Goering

early in October 1939 when he vjas engaged in a dispute

Vith Himmler over the jurisdiction between his office
and the office for the Strengthening of Germandom, in

which he stated that the plan^ for the resettlement of
ethnic Germans in the East had been developed over a

long ^eriod by himself and hi^ organization.

But from

this fact it is necessary not only to infer that he knew

that war was likely, but a second inference that he knew

that it would be an aggressive war.

The danger of setting

inference upon inference, and from the second inference
drawing a conclusion of guilt involves a degree of specu
lation in which the element or likelihood of mistake is
too great.

We hold that proof is insufficient and we therefore
/

ACQUIT DAP.PE under Count One.

-
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DIETBICH

The defendant DIETRICH was Reich Tress Chief and

Tress Chief of the Nazi Party during the entire period

when the G-erman aggressive wars were planned and initiated,
and while he vjas in constant attendance at Hitler's head

quarters as a member of his entourage, the only proof

that he had knovjiedge of these nlans is that he had con

trol over the German and "^arty "^ress which played the
tune before and UDon the initiation of each aggressive
war, which aroused German sentiments in favor of them,
and thus influenced German public opinion.
Although he attended none of the Hitler conferences

to which we have adverted, we de^ it entirely likely that
he had at least a strong inkling of what was about to take
place.

But suspicion, no matter how well founded, does

not take the nlace of proof.

T-e therefore hold that proof

of guilt has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the defendant DIETRICH is ACQUITTED under Count One.

-
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There is no evidence v^hatever

that

the defendant

BERGTIR had knowledge of Hitler's aggressions.

While,

viithout question, he vigorously engaged in waging vjars,
there is nothing to indicate that he knew that they were
aggre.ssiyet or in violation of international law.

He should be and is ACQUITTED under Count One.

SCHEIT 51^'BEBG

At the beginning of the wars described in the
w

Indictment, the defendant rCFELT.EI^"'EERG was a compara
tively minor official in the SD.

He took an active

part in the Venlo incident in which two British agents,

Stevens and Best, were kidnapped on Dutch soil and

brought to Germany, and the Dutch Army Officer Klopf
was killed.

The prosecution assert? that this incident

was used by Hitler as an excuse for the invasion of the

LOW Countries, and therefore SGHETIE^'BERG is criminally
liable.

^

We have no doubt that he was responsible for the

incident in question, and we cannot accept his defense
that he did not know of and had no control over these

kidnappings and the assassination of Hlopf,

The fact

that after it had occurred he was sent to the Foreign

Office to make a report, and that it was the intention
of his superiors to use his report as proof that the

Hetherlands had violated its neutrality is not sufficient,

-
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8S the record does not disclose that he had any knowledge

as to the purpose for which the report was to be used.
While his part in the Venlo incident may subject

him to trial and punishment under Dutch law, that is a

matter over which this Tribunal has no jurisdiction.

There is no evidence tending to Throve that he took any

part in planning, preparing, or initiating any of the

wars described in Count One , or that he had knowledge
r-

^ ,

that they were aggressive, or that with such knowledge
he engaged in waging war.
We therefore ACQUIT the defendant SCTFXTSt^BEPGunder Count One.

QCIT'-JEPIF-KPCSIGir

The defendant BCF^EIN-ICROSIGF, during the entire

Hitler regime, was Eeich Minister of Finance and a member
of the Reich Cabinet.

He was not present at any of the

Hitler conferences at which the latter announced his plans,

nor was he one of Hitler's confidants.
r

That many of his

activities and those of his department dealt with waging

war cannot be questioned, but in the absence of proof
that he knew these wars were aggressive and therefore

without justification, no basis for a judgment of guilty
exists.

We therefore ACQUIT him under Count One.

KOERNER

In a(^t3-ition to the general charges made against all
the defendants named In this count it is specifically charged
tha.t the Defendant

as permanent deputy of Hermann

Goering, played a leading role in the planning, coordination,
and execution of an economic program to prepare the German

Reich for the v^aging of aggressive v.-ar, and that he was fur
ther responsible for coordinating the economic exploitation

of the occuoied territories in furtherance of the waging of

aggressive.war.

It is further specifically charged that he,

together with Goerlng, the defendant KSPPIER and -other per
sons, "oarticipated in the establishment of the Four Ye^r Plan
,/

in 1936, and that thereafter he, as Goering's deputy, directed
the office of the Four Year Plan which was charged with con

trol over the essential economic activities of the German

agencies preparing for war, exercised supreme authority in
economic matters, was res.jonsible for the development and

stockpiling of critical war material which was designed to
prepare the armed forces and the German economy for aggres

sive vvar within four years.

It is further specifically

asserted that between 1939 and 1942, KOEPUER served as Chair^

man of the General Council of the Four Year Plan which was

A

concerned with the problems of labor allocation and produc

tion in 'the v.&r economy.

It is specifically alleged that

KCDRNER^ together with defendant PLEIGER, participated with
Goering and. others in the creation of the Hermann Goerlng

horks in 1937, and that KOERHER, ss Chnirman of the

Aufslchtsrs-t of said organization and holder of other higji
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initii I ,

offices therein was Influential in determining the policies

of this huge organization which vjas founded in furtherance
of the planning, preparation and waging of wars of aggres
sion.

It is further specifically alleged that as early as

November 1940 the defendant KOEaNSR was informed by Goering

of the coming attack ag^^'inst the Soviet Union and that there
after KOERNER attended 3.nd advised the conferences which

werr* convened to consider the scope an^ method of German
exploitation of the Ea,stern economies#

It is proper that at the outset of our treatment of

the charges against KOSRNER short reference is ma(^e to the

high positions heia by him in the Government of the Th.ira
Reich extending over a period of twelve years, a eeriod

encompassing the rise of the Nazi power to its collapse in

1945.

It appears that the defendant became acquainted with

Hermann Goering in 1926.

It appears that inl9»'50 KOERNER

gave up his priva.te business, as he stated in his examina
tion before this Tribunal, to "devote myself wholly to

Goering." It appears that in 1931 he Joined the SS. He
became quite closely associated with Himmler and subse

quently collaborated with Himmler in placing high SS offi
cials in governmental positions. It should be noted here
that it wa.s d.uring this period, that Goering was in charge of
the Gestapo and Him ler was Goering^ s deputy.

It appe0.r8

that after the Nazis established themselves in power in 1933

KCSRNSR becajne Goering's adjutant and. co-worker, and to quote
from his own testimony.before this Tribunal!

"Of course Goering cliscussed many things with
me that he did not ciisouss with others because he
had confidence in me."

In 3936 KCbRNji^R became State Secretary for the Four
Yeo-r P2a.n. He then became deputy chairman of the General

Council in charge of the Four Year Plan.

In 1937 he became

Ohairman of the Supervisory Board of the Hermann Goering
Vorks.

In 1940 he was Goering's deputy in the Economic

Leadership Staff East which was an organization created for

the exploitation of Russia,

In 1942 he became a member of .

the Central Planning Board,
m

The Question whether defendant KOEPUER is guilty under

this count "evolves greatly around his Position and activi
ties as deputy to Goering as Plenipotentiary in chargp> of the
Four Yeer Plan, as ^^eputy 'Chairman of the General Council,
and as member of the Central Planning Board,

The Four Year

Plan was established in 1936, the establishment being

ajinounced at the Reich Party rally in Nurnberg on 9 September
of that year.

At such time Goering was appointed as plenipo

tentiary in charge and was vested with extensive and sweeping

authority to compe 1 cooperation "of a H governmental and Party

agencies.

A Ministers* Council, referred, to as the General

Council, was created for the making of principal decisions in
It

connection with the Four Year Plan and its work.

Such coun

cil included., among others, the State Becpstary and Chief of
the Reich Chancellory, defendant LAMI^ERS, and. defendant

KEPI^LER.

KOEPUEH was Deputy Chairman of such C-enersl Council

for the Four Year FTa-nfrom 1939 to 1942.
the title of deputy Cheirman
thereof,

%lle only carrying

was the virtual chairman

he regularly presided.
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Tho Central Planning Boarci, of which he was a member,
I

after 1942 was an official agency of the Four Year Plan.

It

was in fact the means through which the German war effort
was directed from 1942 to 1945. aich Central Planning Boara

was composed of three members, Albert Speer, Erhardt Milch,
and defendant KOhFJ^IER. The function of the Central Planning
Boart^ was pi-anning for the distribution and allocation of
raw materials necessary for war, pnd the allocation of : iman-

power for the war economy.

It seems thst in 1945 Walter Funk

was appointed as the fourth member of the Central Planning
r.

^

v-'

Board

That the real aim and ourpose of the Pour Year Plaii was

to prepare Germany for war becomes clear from the evidence,
jt is noteworthy that,on 14 October 1959, Heich Minister for
Economy Punk, in discussing the tasks of the Gorman war econ
omy stated:

"It is known that the German war potential

has been strengthened very considerably by the con
quest of Poland. e owe it mainly to the Four Year
Plan, that we coqld enter the war economically so
strong and well prepared..
.One can evaluate
correctly, what the Four Year Plan means for
economic preparation of war, only when one o^nsid rs
that the Four Year Plan does not

food and raw material economy, only the
trial economic life, but that it also Inc

; •
^

eign commerce, money and foreign-exchange
y
^
production in Germany is authoritatively determined
and executed by this plan. Although all the econ
omic and financial departments were
_
the tasks and work of the Pour lear Plan under the

and finance, so thst the entire economic

leadership of Generalfeldmarschall Goering,
war economic preparation of Germany
advanced in secret in another sector for m^y years,
namelv, by means of the formation of e national

guiding aUratus for tbe special war economic tasks,

which had to be masterfd at that moment, wben
condition of war became a fact.
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Further emphasizing the highly important role played
by the Four Yepr Plan there is in evidence a report of the
Militp.ry economic ^taff of the OKW in Yay 1943; confif^ential

report on "The history of the G-erman War and Armament Sponomy"
by "General %omas, head of the Military Economic Staff of the
an acdress by State Secretary Neumann,

"A Reorganization

of the Four Yepr Plan,^' which speech was made on 24 April 1941;
and an article by State Secretary Neumann and one Dr. Donner,

"The Four ^ear Plan and Its Organizational Questions."
That the Four Year Plan was an instrumentality for the

planning and c^^rrying on of aggressions is no longer a matter
Jt

of dispute.

Ihe defendant KOERNER, however, has sought to

plead ignoronce of the fact that the Four Year plan was in
\J

fact instrumental in the planning, preparation and waging of
aggressive war.

He has further sought to minimize his

authority as Ooering's deputy in directing theolans and pro
grams of the Four Year Plan.

Neither of such defenses can

be successfully maintained, in the face of the strong and
positive evidence to the contrary.

The truth of the matter

is that in August 1936 Hitler privately gave Hermann Croering
a memoranduni concerning the tasks of the prospective Four
Year Plan.

It appears from the testimony that of the only

three copies of this memorandum prepared G-oering received one

copy and another copy was presented, to Albert Soeer while the

third copy apparently is unaccounted for.

It is significant

that this memorandum, a cony of which was introduced in t^^is

case, sets forth the tasks given Goering in tv^e Four Year Plan,
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the following:
"1. The German Army must be ready for combat within
four years,

"2, The German economy must be mobilized for war
within four years,"
The memorandum also stated:

"The extent and pace of the military exploitation
of our strength cannot be too large or too rapid,"
*

45-

•«•

#

*

"The definitive solution lies in the extension

of our living space.

That is an extension of

the raw materials and food bases of our nation.

It is the task of the political leadership to
solve this question at some future time."
And further,

"Much more important, however, is to prepare for

the war during the peace."

It appears that in a meeting of the Ministerial Council held
on 4 September 1936, under the chairmanship of Goering,

which meeting was attended by KOERNSR, Goering read the
Hitler memorandum above referred to.

In testifying before this Tribunal on 4 August 1948
the defendsJit admitted that Goering had given him the mem-

orandum to read and that he, the defendant, had read, all
of it.

'^he memorandum referred to would indicate that

KOErlNhR had knowledge of the aggressive a.ims and purposes
of the Four lear Plan at such an early date as 1936, and it

is significant also that on 26 May 1936 KOERNSR with other
defendants, and General Keitel, Chief of the VJehrmacht,

attended a top secret meeting of Goering's Supervisory
Committee on Raw Materials.

At such meeting there was

considerable discussion relative to the great need for

oil, rubber and iron ore.

The minutes disclose, among
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other things, the following:
"with a thorough mobilization of the army eni^ navy,
the whole problem of conducting the war deoends on
this»
All preparations must be made for the A~case
so that the supplying of the v-artlme army is safe
guarded. "
He testified before t'" is Tribunal on 29 July 1948 and
admitted that he knew that the Four Year plan had military
economic aims.

The defendant KOrjRNER,

in his testimony on

50 July 1948, in discussing the last mentioned meeting pre

sided over by Goering, stated with respect to "A-cpse" t^ere
mentioned, w' ich apparently wps a code term to Indicate —
in case

of war:

"We thought a lot of the A-case, but it never

j

occurred to us that Germany would attack; we were
a.nticipating an attack on Germany.''
In evidence is an exb.ibit consisting of the report of

p speech of Hermann Goering on the execution of the Four Year
Plan, dated 17 December 1956, where i t is stated;

"In closing Goering demanded unrestricted utiliza
tion of all power in the whole economic field.
All selfish interests must be out aside.

Cur

whole nation is at stake. We live in « time when

the final dispute is in sight.

We are already on

the threshhold of mobilization and are at w^r.

Only the guns are not yet being fired."
In testifying before the Tribunal on 50 July 1948, upon

^

being asked whether the foregoing statement and vari'^us other
sta^^ements made by Goering calling for rspld and extensive
mobilization of the economy of Germany for military ourposes

4

did not indicate to him that the Four Year Plan was designed

to prepare Germany for war, and even to prepare Germany for
an aggressive war, the defendant stated:
"I do not deny that such statement or similar'
stateiucnts were made by Gk)ering here and elsewhere.
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"Of course, the ciocument is not an officip,!
document "but is a reoor(^ drawn up subsequently
by an economic group; therefore, it is not
certain that G-oering actually used the language
given in the record.
It is possible tha.t he did.

You can und.erstand Goering's language only if
you know the conditions that prevailed at the
time
At that time, according to my opinion,
i t was definitely not we who were proposing to
bring about any conflict with Russia or were

designing to bring about any such conflict,"
On 82 October 1936 Goering appointed the defendant

KOiiRNiiR as his deputy.

The order provided;

"In all current business concerning the Four Ye^^^r
Plan, I shall be represented by State Secretary
KO^dkNliR, "

In this decree Goering also set up the Council of Ministers
to collaborate with him, which has been hereinbefore referred

to as the General Council.

In his testimony before this

Tribunal the defendant KOERNSR admitted thst Goering, through
the aforesaid grants of power to him by Hitler,had become
well nigh"

all-powerful in the economic sphere, the defend

ant stating:

"All ri;;hts which Hitler possessed himself could
novT, in the economic sphere, also be exercised by

Goering."
Thus we now have KOERHER as deputy to the most powerful man
in the Reich in the economic field, the man who under the
Four Year Plan had the task "to make Germany ready for v'8,r

in four years,"

ICOr^RNER, as Goering's deputy, represented

him from time to time at important meetings where pniicies

were being formulated.

That a man in such position could be

without knowledge as to the aggre'^sive nature of the plans
under consideration is impossible of belief.
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The repeated assertions of K0ERN5R to the effect that

Goering was trying to avoid war and he was in fact a man of
peace is such a transparent effort to conceal his own know

ledge and motives that we need not dwell thereon at length.
It should not be forgotten, however, that V'^ls is the same

Goering who was tried before the International Military
Tribunal- 'hich sta.ted_ In th-e course of its Judgment:

"From the m-ment he joined the Party in l°e2
and took command of the street-fighting organiza

tion, the SA- Goering was the adviser, the active

agent of Hitler, and one of the prime loaders of
the Nazi movement. As Hitler s p-p litioal d eputy
he was largelv instrumental in br.mging the
National Socialists to power in 193", and was

charged with consolidating this power and expand
ing German armed might. He developed the Gestapo,

and created the first concentration camps, roiin-

.quishing them to Himmlei- in 19M, conducted the
Rochm purge in that year, and engineered the sor
did proceedings which resulted in the removal of
von Blomberg and vcn Fritsch from the Army. In

1956 he became Ple^nipotontiary for the i?our Year

plan, and in theory and in practice was the econoraic dictator of the Reich, shortly afmer the
Pact of Munich, he announced that he would embark
on a five-fold expansion of the Luftwaffe, and
speed rearmament with emphasis on offensive
weapons."
^

*

44-

«

".„..The night before the invasion of

Czechoslovakia and the absorption of Bohemia and

Moravia, at a conference with Hitler and

President Hacha, he threatened to bomb Prague if
Hacha did not submit. This threat he admitted
in his testimony."
^

^

^

#

"After his own admissions to this Tribuna.l,

from the positions w'"ich he ^eld, the conferences
he attended, and the public word^ he uttered,
there can remain no doubt that Goering was the

moving force for aggressive war, second only to
Hitler.

Ha was the planner and prime mover in

the military and. diplomatic preparation for war

which Germany pursued, "
44-

44-

4^

«

"...His guilt is unique in its enormity.

record discloses no excuses for this man,"
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The

The further clefense of KCSiRNER to the effect thnt

he ha'^' no real authority or discretionary power in the

high positions he held is not supported by the evidence»
On the contrary, the evidence amply establishes the wide

scope of his authority and discretion in the positions he
held, and which enabled him to shape policy and influence

'Plans and preparations of aggression.

We nerd-not here

discuss in detail the many and. various items of evidence

that convincingly establish his authority,

^"e will here

only allude to statements made by him during his examina
tion before the Tribunal.

These bear directly upon the

scope of his authority and discretion.

In testifying before this Tribunal on 30 July 1948
he stated:

"I was Goering*s deputy in all current affairs
concerning the Four Year Plan,
Then he stated further by way of explanation:

"Current affairs includes everything connected

with decisions already taken by Goering, in
contrast to the d.ecisions themselves, I myself
had to see to it that questions on which deci
sions were to be made were submitted; that
orders on issues which had been decided were

prepared and published, and I also had to ^

prepare Goering's decisions insofar as on the

Council of the Four Year Plan I was chairman,
as deputy of Goering,"

In response to a question, "Had Goering issued any orders
were you able to deputize for him?" he answered:
"Yes, if a matter was already under way and

Goering had already decided it, and subse

quently individual ordprs became necessary

then i could,

l?hat was curnent business."

KOERNER*S counsel later asked KOSRNER the following question;

"If I understand you correctly you, yourself,
are of the opinion that the individual instruc
tions which hac to be given after Goering had
made a fundamental decision could be issued by
you yourself?"

,ai

The defendant answered, "Yes, naturally."
•Subsequently, on cross-examination before this Tribunal
on 4 August 1948, when ashed if it would be a fair summary

of his position to say that he was "Chief of the office of
the

Four Year Plan and in charge ?f the management nnd

supervision of that office?" he ansv;ered:
"Yes, v;ith the management and supervision of the

agen'cy.

That was entrusted to my care, ye-s."

In his testimony before the Tribunal KOERNSR described
his tasks on the G-eneral Council as follows:

^

"Yes, it was my tadc to coordinate the various
agencies insof^^r as t"! is was ppssiblo with the

special orders being issued.

•'•his adjusting

position, as I think you might call it, I exer
cised in pa,rticular on the General Council of

Vy

the Four Year Plan."
Other testimony in the record indicates that it was the
function of the General Council to investigate all measures

for making the Four Year plan work„

In the light of the foregoing, and other evidence in

the record not here specifically alluded to, wi^ioh establish
the wide scope of his authority and activities as Goerlng's
deputy in the Four Year Plan and his close association, both
socially and offioially, with Goering, and his long service
as Deputy Chairma.n of the General Council, at the meetings

of which he, and not Goering, usually presided, his asserted
ip-norance of the role of the Four Year Plan In the plans>

preparations and execution of various Nazi acrgressinns here
involved,

becomes incredible.

The for. going observations have not dealt specifically
with evidence bearing on the aggressions against any speci
fically named country,

"e will now touch briefly on -some
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portions of th© evidence dealing therewith.'

Accor<^ing to

KOERNER'S own testimony before the Tribunal, he saw a

change in Hitler's attitude after 19:^5 for he states?
"In 1938 I ha^ certain misgivings concerning

the repercussions concerning such vehement
actions and drive..,."

Shortly before the invasion of Austria Hitler

reorganized the Pour Year Plan and in so doine: olaced the
Ministry of -Economic Affairs under G-oering.

Goering by

a decree dated 5 February 1938 made certain specific

provisions relating to such reorganization, among them
*

the following:
"My permanent deputy in all matters concerning
the iJcur Year Plan is State Secretary KOEHNER,
as up to this, time.
*

^

*

"In order to secure in the future also the neces

sary cooperation in current affairs among the
various departments concerned in the Pour Year

Plan, the &oneralrat (G-eheral Council) will

rema. n in cxis'cence,
The ^-eneral Council has
to trke core of the necessary connections and

has to organize the tasks according to uniform
points of view. In the G-eneral Council, the
individual plannings of the Ministries will be
put into accord with one another and. then com
bined into a total planning,"

Only about a month after the Issusnce of this decree
Austria was invaded by the Reich forces.

VJhile there does not seem to be any d.lrect evidence

to show that KOEMER knew of the exact date of the invasion

^

of Austria, it is quite evident that he knew that such an

invasion was in contemplation for on 17 March 1937 KOERNER
wa-s pi'esentsit a meeting conducted by Goering with respect

to production of iron and steel,

The minutes of such meet

ing in- icate that among other things Goering stressed:
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"1) Present supply for the various native and
foreign sources,

"2) Supply which may be anticipated at present
and" in A-Fall in the immediate future.

"3) Supply from' native German soil to which in
A-^all receipts from Austria with

her possibilities are to be added."

-ij"

*

*

*

all

«

"G-oerihg continues; Also in Austria there are still
many deposits which must be taken care of."

"Thereby he arrived at the critical question of
G-errnan low-grade iron ores.
The question of
profitableness must be entirely disregar'^ed here,
although industry is otherwise bound, by an s^rraamcnts firm, vr^ich, by utilizing its capacity for
a normal level of production cannot exceed a cer
tain limit of production is nevertheless instructed

^>

to expand although no economic results can be
expected.

Nevertheless, this must happen.

He is

purposely leaving aside the question of how far
the iron industrialists can carry this out them
selves and to what extent they must receive aid.

If vital plants are involved of which the state
cannot demand so much that the firms would be

ruined, then^the state must help because these
measures would have to be prepared for under all
circumstances.
It does not differ from the case
of the production of explosives or guns, where
one can lust as little inquire about profitable
ness.
The same point Of view applies to lowgrad.e iron ores."

"In this respect i t is important that the soil of
Austria is reckoned as part of Ci-ermany in case of

%

"^ar.

Such d.eposits as can be acquired in Austria

must be attended, to in ord.er to increase our supply
capacity. Aistria is rich in ore."
(Underscoring
supp Hed).

That KOERNEFi regarded such invasion of Austria as a proper
act was subsequently admitted by him for in October 1945 he
stated:
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"I always considered the Austrian question as

a problem which Hitler would solve as early as
possible at a suitable momenta In the spring
of 1938 the situation w as ripe and we could
ma:.''ch into Austria without large military pre
parations. "

Immediately following the invasion of Austria it appears
that KCHRNSR was instrumental in accelerating the prot^uction of munitions of war.

It is claimed that this was for

defensive purposes only* and he persists that Goerlng

warned Hitler against actions that would lead to wer.
Meanwhile, however,

Goering was urging the construction

of bombers capable of carrying a bombload of five tons to
New York and then returning,

KOERNEH admits that he knew

of this activity of Goering's.
It appears on 14 October 1938, at a. secret meeting

of the air ministries at which KOEBNSR was present, the
notes Indicate that Goering stated:

"The armadent should not be curtailed by the

export activity.

He received the order from

the Fuehrer to increase the armament to an

abnormal extent, the air force having first

priority.

Within the shortest time the air

force is to be increased five-fold, also the

ne.'VY should, get armed more rapidly and the
army should procure large amounts of offen
sive weapons at a faster rate, particularly

heavy artillery pieces and heavy tanks®

Along with this manufactured armaments must
go; especially fuel, powder and explosives
are moved into the foreground. It should be
coupled with the accelersted construction of

highways, canals, and. particularly of the
railroads.

"To tbis comas the Four Years' Pl^n which is

to be reorganized according to tv/o points of
view,

"In the Four Years' Plan in 1st place ^^11 the
constructions which are In the service of arma

ment are to be promoted and in Spd place all
the installations are to be created w>^.ich reolly
spare foreign exchange."
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It appears also that in February 1938 KOERNiR extended to

the Fuehrer an uncont?Itlonal pledge "that '^erman economy
will actually obtain her goal as set by him."
""ith respect to the invasion of Czechoslovakia which

took place on 15 March 1939, the evidence shows conclusively
that KOERNER was aware of the impending aggression sometime

before it occurred.

Here again he asserts it vras Goering who

tol5 him that Hitler was going to 'i^cupy Prague and that
Goering was opposed to the contemplated action as he feared,

it would lead to war.

^

In this connection it is again well

to remember that the IMT findings are to the effect that
(Jeering admitted that he had threatened to bomb Prague if

J

President Hacha of CzechoSlovakia did not submit.
In evidence is a note relative to a conference of 25

July 1939 conducted, by Goering and in which KOERNER was
present.

This s'-ows that:;

"In a rather long statement the Field Marshal
explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and
Moravia into the ^erman economy had taken place,

among other reasons, to increase the German War

potential by exploitation of the industry there,"
KOERMER, In his testimony before this Tribunal on 30 July

1948, admitted remembering that Goering had mentioned
Bohemia-Moravia but insisted that he did not understand the
situation to be as indicated in the note.

But KOERNER,

during such testimony, went on to admit:
"For the rest, tbe situation was so threatening
that it seemed a matter of course to us that the

military potential of the Protectorate which we
now had and which was not being exploited would
have to be exploited,"
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lull ilf ..(III

A short time after the invasion of Bohemia-Moravia,

the General Council, at a meeting presided over by KOERNER
on 28 April 1939 received a report which, among other things,
stated:

"In other words, the economic area of G'reater
Germany is too, small to satisfy the military
economic requirements as to mineral oil and the

r

newly and successfully taken ud contact with
Southeastern ^Europe shows us the only and hope
ful possibility to ensure supplies for the min

eral oil economy completely for many years by

securing tbis area by means of the Wehrmacht.'
(Underscoring supp lied).
4{'

-}{•

*

*

"It is essential for Germany to strengthen its
own war potential as well ae that of its =tllies
to such an extent that the coalition is equal to
the efforts of Practically the rest of the world.
This can be achieved only by new, strong and
combined efforts by a l l of the allies,

and by

expanding and improving the greater economic
domain corresponding to the improved raw mater
ial basis of the coalition, peaceably at first,
to the Balkans and Spain,

*

"If action does not follow upon these thoughts • *

with the greatest possible speed, all sacri
fices of blood' in the next war will not spare
us the bitter end wrich already once before we

have brought upon ourselves owing to lack of

foresight and fixed purposes."

*

That the planning of the General Council was for aggres

sion and not for defensive purposes seems clear from this
exhibit.

Testimony before this Tribunal on 30 July 1948

shows that the foregoing report was submitted to the Genera.l
Council by one Dr. Arauch in his capacity as Plenipotentiary
General for Chemical Production,

to

such

document

he

remembered

it

the

defendant

but

claimed
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In testifying with respect

KOERMER
that

it

indicated
was

not

that

reported or read to the General Council in its present form.
He claimed that the "Political remarks which are contained

in the draft" were not read by Krauch.

In view of the fact

that this particular report as introduced consists of approx

imately fifty legal-sized pages, this display of memory is

nothing short of remarkable, especially in view of the fact
that the witness in other phases of his testimony exhibited
a not especially retentive memory.

Illustrative of this

lack of memory on details is the testimony as given on 4

August 1948 with respect to a meeting with the traitor
Quisling.

In the course of the examination by his own coun

sel he was questioned with respect to the support which was

being contemplated for Quisling, and he was asked the ques
tion:

"What forms of assistance or support were discussed?"
To this he

answered:
9

"Of course today I wouldn't be able to recollect the
details any longer,"

In August 1939 KOHRNhR adjnits he was told by Coering
that Hitler then had decided to attack Poland and again

Goering is alleged to have indicated that he was opposed to
the contemplated move.

It appears, however, that defendant's

attitude as a witness is such that his assertions as to

Goering's attitude cannot be accepted without reservation.
The defendant has admitted that under certain conditions he
will not as a witness te U the whole truth,

refer to his

examination before this Tribunal with respect to his having

been a witness before the International T^^ilitary Tribunal

when his former chief Goering was on trial,
KOERNER'S testimony on said matter:
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quote from

"I think that I did give a certain clarifica
tion there.
Of course I did so in a more cau
tious manner than now because a t that time I

was a witness on behalf of G-oering and I had
to take certain considerations into account in

behalf of my old chief,
I didn't defend him^
but I gave certain statements which I beHeve
were capable of exonerating him, so far as I

was able to exonerate him.

That's the way you

have to look at these things."
The evidence indicates that KOERNER participated in

the planning and preparation of the aggression

Russia.

against

It appears from the evidence that actual planning

against Russia commenced in the winter of 1940,

G-eneral

Thomas, former head of the Military Economic Office and the

Armament Office of the High Command of the ^fehrmacht in his
"Basic Facts for History of G-erman War and Armaments

Economy" made the following entries:

"In November 1940, the Chief of ¥i. Rue, together
with Secretaries of State KOERIJER, Neumann, Backe
and G-eneral von Hanneken were informed by the
Reich Marshal-of the action planned in the East.

"By reason of these directives the preliminary
preparations for the action in the East were com

menced by the Office of Wi. Rue at the end of 1940.

"The preliminary preparations for the action in
the East included first of all the following tasks:

1). Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian
Armament indu-try, its location, its capacity
and i t s associate industries.

2). Investigation of the capacity of the different
big armament centers and their dependency one
on the other.

3). Determine the power and transport system for
the industry of the Soviet Union,

4), Investigation of sources of raw materials and
petroleum (crude oil).
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•'5),

Prepar-ition of a survey of ini.ustrles other
than arm;iinent industries in the Soviet Union.
"These points were concentrated in one big

compilation of 'War Economy of the Soviet Union'
and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.
"Furthermore a card index was made,

containing

all the important factories in Soviet Russia and
a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language
for the use of the German war economy organization,

"For the processing of these problems a task
staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lt,.
Col. Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier
General Schubert.

The work was carried out

according to the directives from the Chief of

the office, respectively the group of departments
for foreign territories (Ausland) with the coopera
tion of all deoartments, economy offices and any

other persons possessing information on Russia.
Through these intensive preparative activities
an excellent collection of material was made,

which proved of the utmost value later on for

carrying out the operations and for administering
the territories."

We should here remind ourself that the invasion of
Russia commenced 22 June 1941.

One Gustav Schlotterer, who between 1941 .-md 1944

was a Ministerial Director in charge of the Eastern Depart
ment of the Ministry of Economics and as a deputy was a

representative of such Ministry in the Economic Staff East,
testified before the Tribunal on 12 February 1948 as
follows:

"A

It must have been either in March or at the

beginning of April 1941 when General von
Hjinneken asked me
told me that in a

to come and see him.
He
conference with State

Secretary KOERNER the form,ation of ;ai
economic staff, for the event of a possible

occupation of Eastern Territories in Russia,
was being decided upon. General Schubert
was to be put in ch/irge of that staff,

whereas I, myself, was to represent the Reich
Ministry of Economic Affairs on the st:iff.
Would I, therefore, please contact General
Schubert.
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"Q Un-^er whrtt iirune w:ts the proposed, org-tnizatlon to be?

"A It WHS suppose'! to be CHlle-i Economic Stnff
Ol'ienburg.

"Q Whs thnt the ccie nnme?
"A

Yes.

^

"Q Whs this coie nHine hept secret?
"A It WHS restricted to internnl communiCHtions
between 'governmenth1 depHrtments only inosf-Hr
as it WHS neceas.try to chII in government
departments nt all."

In testifying before the Tribunal on 30 July 1948
KOERNER admitted that he had advance notice of the pl/tnned
attach on Russia.

A memor-induin of a conference of array officers in

the office of General Thomas on 28 February 1941 which

bears the heading, "Re Oldenburg," .among other things,
states:

- "The general ordered that a brortder plan of

prganization be dr.afted for the Reich Marshal.

Essential Points:

"l) The whole organization to be suoordinate
to the Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support
and extension of the measures of the Four
Year Plan."

It appears that on 19 March 1941 Gener.'d Thomas made a
memorandum of a report to Goering relative to Organization
Barbarossa, which was the code name for the contemplated

operations in Russia. Such memorandum states in part:
"The following matters will be the suoject of
the report:;

"1)

Organization Barbarossa,

"The Reichsmarshall fully agrees with the

organization which was proposed to him.
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"The following persons sh-ill oecome memoers
of the executive st.-Lff: KO^RWER, Bncke,

Hunnehen, Alpers -unl Thomas.
"The Wi Rue Amt will be the executive office.

"The Reichsm;irsh;ill considers it important that
n uniform organization be create*!. He agrees
that in*iividual agencies will be unler the
lea-iershlo of officers, particularly

General

Schubert.' The heals of the economic inspectorates

the Reichsmarshall wants to see in person.

Hanneken is ashel to propose the best personalities
out of the economy.

"E)

The Reichsmarshall approval of the regulations
workel out in Wi f»r lestructive measures by
the Luftwaffe in Case Barbarossa.
A copy wls

given to Gapt. von Brauchitsch for forwarling
it to the General Staff of the Air Force."

Bearing on KOERNER'S participation in the plannel -Lge^ression

f

agdnst Russia is a report, l.-ttel 28 June 1941, "On the
Preoar.'.tory Work in Eastern Europe-in Questions" -ml apparently
em.'xnating from Alfrel Rosenberg, which report allules to many
conferences relative to the war economic intentions of the

Economic Oper-ition-il Staff East, the report stating that in
connection therewith "almost l*dly conferences wore then hell
with Dr. Schlotterer. . . . "

It also st-ites,

"In this connection I h-tl conferences with

Gener/il Thomas, St-ite Secret-try KOERNER, State
Secret-try B-tc]^e, Ministerial Director Riecke,
General Schubert, -inl others. Par-re-iching
agreement w-ts re-tchel in the e;istern questions
as rep^arls lirect technical work now ^tnl in the
future,"

It is inleel significant that the minutes of a General
I

Council meeting hell on 24 June 1941, presilel over oy
KOERilER,

recitol that:
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"state Secretury KOERNER opened, the meeting
'

and stated that owing to preparations for the

Case of war with Russia (Eventu-dfall 'Russland')
the convocation of the General Council had to be

omitted up to now.

Since the fighting in Russia

has now started, he was able to m.-Jie the following
statements about the work which has been done

within the Economic Operations Staff East:

"The entire Economic Command in the newly
Occupied Eastern Territories is in the hands of

the Reichsmarshall as Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan.

The Reichsmarshall is to m;Jte

use of the services of the Economic Operations

Staff East which consists of the representatives
of the leading departments. The measures are
to be Carried out by the Economic Staff East
under the leadership of Lieutenant General

Schubert, who is supported for the industrial
sector by Minister!aldirigent Dr. Schlotterer,,
and for t.he agricultural sector by Ministerialdirector Riecke.

"The Economic Command in the nev/ly

Occupied

Territories should direct its activities to

extracting the maximum quantities of goods
required for the war effort, particularly steel,
mineral oil and feed.
All other ooints of view
should take second olace,

"The neoess.ary organization is in existence
and vjill be utilized in accordance with the

progress of military operations."

It should be noted that the above-mentioned meeting
of the General Council was held just two days after the
invasion of Russia.
%

We have specifically alluded to but a small portion

of the voluminous evidence introduced "'ith respect to
these matters, but the foregoing and other evidence in
the record satisfies the Tribunal beyond reasonable doubt

that defendant KOERNER participated in the plans, prepara
tions and execution of the Reich's aggression against
Russia.

The defense sought to ostablish that the attack
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ag.'iinst Russia '\vas not an illegal aggression but a

permissible defensive attack."

Concerning such defense

it Is sufficient to call attention to the following state
ment of the International Military Tribunal:

"It w.as contended for the defendants that
the attack upon "the USSR was justified because
the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack
upon Germ-iny, and m-d^:ing preparations to that

end.

It is impossible to believe that thi-s -

viev/ was ever honestly entertained.

"The plans for the economic exploitation
of the USSR for the remov.al of masses of the

population, for the murder of Commissars and

politic.'il leaders, were all psirt of the care
fully prepared scheme launched on 22 June without
warning of any kind, and without the shadow of

leg.al excuse.

It was plain aggression."

The Tribunal finds the defend;.nt KOERl^ER GUILTY under
Count One,

(
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iiBiiM*wtilii>iiniii%ir'iiftiiii H nirirr-iT

PLEIGER

There is no evi'ience which tien'is to .•isser't "thit

PLEIGER ht-i .-iny knowletige of or took ;iny part in the

plans, initiating or waging of aggressive war.

His

field of activities was wholly in the economic and
industrial field.

He of course had knowledge that

Germany w.as rearming and the development of the ironore field at S.-azgitter, 'and of the Hermann Goering
Works there, which were organizations entirely the
children

^
♦

of his brain and the result of his energy.

But, as was determined by the International Military
Tribunal, rearm.*iment, in and of itself, is no offense

against international law.

It c.-m only be so when it

Is undert;Jcen with the intent and purpose to use the
rearmament for aggressive war.

That proof is here lacking and we therefore

acquit the defendant PLEIGER under Count One.

I
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